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HORACE B. ROBERTSON, JR.*
Two recent cases, one from New York and one from Illinois, have
again focused attention on injuries to the unborn. In the first of these,
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,' the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
child who suffered permanent disability to various organs, her brain
and her nervous system as the result of the negligent transfusing of her
Rh-negative mother with Rh-positive blood some nine years prior to
the child's conception had a cause of action for negligence. In Becker v.
Schwartz,2 the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Di-
vision's decision in Park v. Chessin3 which had recognized for the first
time in American jurisprudence a "wrongful life" cause of action on
behalf of a child born with a disabling kidney disease from which she
died two and one-half years later. The so-called "wrongful life" count
was based on the alleged malpractice of the defendant physicians in
misadvising the child's prospective parents, whose previous child had
died a few hours after birth from the same disease, that a second child
would not suffer from the disease, thus allowing the parents to make a
* Professor of Law, Duke University. B.S. 1945, U.S. Naval Academy; J.D. 1953,
Georgetown University; M.S. 1968, George Washington University.
The author expresses his appreciation to Steve C. Miller and Scotty P. Krob, Duke Law
School classes of 1979 and 1980, respectively, for their research assistance in the preparation of
this Article.
1. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
2. 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
3. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977). In Becker v. Schwartz, 60 App. Div. 2d
587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), decided the day following Park, the Appellate Division relied on
Park in holding that a wrongful life cause of action on behalf of an infant born with Downs
syndrome (mongolism) was stated by a complaint alleging that the defendant-physicians did not
advise the infant's parents of the increased risk of Downs Syndrome in children born to women
over 35 nor of the availability of an amniocentesis test to determine whether the fetus would be
born with the condition.
The New York Court of Appeals decision on appeal of both Park and Becker is styled Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
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conscious choice to seek conception of the second child. These two
cases represent the most significant recent decisions in a field of tort
liability that has been developing rapidly since a right of recovery for
prenatal injuries was first recognized in 1946.4
In 1972, the Alabama Supreme Court made American jurisdic-
tions unanimous in recognizing that one who intentionally or negli-
gently injures an unborn fetus may be liable in damages.' The uniform
recognition of this right of recovery represented a complete reversal of
American jurisprudence in this area of the law in slightly less than
thirty years.6 The shift started with the landmark case of Bonbrest v.
.Kotz,7 in which the District Court for the District of Columbia allowed
recovery against an attending physician for injuries inflicted on an in-
fant en ventre sa mbre who was born alive. This case represented the
first significant challenge to Dietrich v. Northampton,8 the uniformly
followed decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in which Justice
Holmes denied a cause of action for injuries to the unborn. Bonbrest,
however, expressed an idea whose time had come, and, within a few
years, nearly all jurisdictions that faced the issue granted relief in some
form.
Despite the general and almost immediate recognition (post-
Bonbrest) that a cause of action exists, the courts are continuing to sort
out the intricacies of the cause of action and to work out the extent of
and limitations upon liability. Courts were-and to some extent still
are- divided on such issues as whether the fetus must be "viable" 9 at
the time of injury; whether the child must be born alive; whether an
unborn infant has a cause of action for wrongful death; and, most re-
4. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
5. Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So.2d 596 (1972).
6. In all jurisdictions except California, Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d
678 (1939) (cause of action allowed because of the particular wording of the California statute)
and Louisiana, Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (Civil Code of Louisiana held to
support a cause of action), the reversal occurred through the common law process of court deci-
sion.
7. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
8. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
9. As commonly used both by courts and by medical practitioners, "viability" describes the
point in the life of the fetus at which it could maintain life if removed from its mother's womb.
The term first arose in a legal context in Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184
Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), overruled, Amarm v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 117 N.E.2d 412 (1953). Bio-
logically, the point of viability is reached somewhere between the twentieth and twenty-eighth
week of pregnancy when the fetus weighs between 400 and 1000 grams. Survival of small imma-
ture fetuses is to a large extent a function of the availability of expert neonatal care. L. HELLMAN
& J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTrRIcs 493 (14th ed. 1971); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
(23d ed. 1976). Courts have acknowledged that "legal' viability should begin when there is bio-
logical viability or separability. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); see
Gordon, The Unborn Plaintoq , 63 MICH. L. REv. 579, 589 (1965).
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cently, whether a cause of action exists for "wrongful life."" ° Courts
have also labored over the proper conceptual basis for allowing or de-
nying a cause of action. For example, in the early cases, the reasons for
denying recovery included the lack of a duty to an unborn fetus," the
difficulty of showing causation, 2 the danger of encouraging spurious or
doubtful claims 3 and the lack of standing of an unborn child as a per-
son.' 4 When courts began to grant the right of recovery, the reasons
given for such changes of position included the advances in medical
knowledge recognizing the separate existence of the fetus from the
mother,'5 the injustice of nonrecognition of a cause of action,' 6 the rec-
ognition of the "personhood" of the fetus 17 and analogy to other
10. The term "wrongful life" apparently was coined by the Illinois Court of Appeals in its
opinion in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964), to describe a "new tort," the essence of which is the coincidence of the wrongful act with
the moment of conception. In Zepeda the alleged wrongful act was the father's fraudulent induce-
ment of the plaintiff's mother to perform sexual intercourse, which resulted in the subsequent
illegitimate birth of the plaintiff. The term, or its twin, "wrongful birth," has also been used to
describe the wrong for which compensation was sought in such cases as Williams v. State, 18
N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (action against state for negligent supervi-
sion of plaintiffs mother, a patient in a New York institution, as a result of which plaintiff was
born illegitimately to a mentally defective mother); Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) (action against father for plaintiffs illegitimate birth); and Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis.
2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974) (also an action against father for plaintiff's illegitimacy). During the
last decade the term has been expanded to include any birth which allegedly should have been
prevented by sterilization, contraception or abortion. In Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404
N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978), the New York Court of Claims called the term "wrongful life" an "unfortu-
nate" one, primarily because it is inaccurate as a description either of the wrong that has been
committed or of the injury suffered. Id. at 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953. The term, nevertheless,
seems to have found a place in American jurisprudence.
11. E.g., Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169,49 A. 704 (1901), overruled, Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101
R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d
944 (1935), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (1967).
12. E.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926), overruled,
Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So.2d 596 (1972); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820 (1967).
13. E.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926), overruled,
Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So.2d 596 (1972); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820 (1967).
14. E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), overruled, Amann v
Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 117 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
15. E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265
So.2d 596 (1972); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Kelly v. Gregory,
282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
16. E.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Il.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); White v. Yup,
85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969).
17. E.g., White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
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branches of the law. 8 Some courts made a distinction between cases in
which a child received permanent injuries not causing death and
wrongful death actions,' 9 while others failed to recognize the concep-
tual and practical differences involved in the adjudication of these
cases.2" Determining the proper foundation of the duty of care toward
the unborn has proven particularly difficult because some of the devel-
opments in tort law cannot be squared with compelling analogies to
other branches of the law.2
The recent decisions in Illinois and New York provide an appro-
priate occasion for an examination of the current state of the law of
injuries to the unborn and for an analysis of the underlying legal poli-
cies. First, this Article will trace the development of tort causes of ac-
tion for prenatal injuries from the denial of such actions in early cases
to the their acceptance in current law. The Article then will discuss
several suggested theoretical bases for the cause of action for prenatal
injuries and will resolve that the proper conceptualization is of a duty
contingent upon live birth-thus rejecting the requirement of viability.
Finally, the Article will turn to a discussion of the "New Jurispru-
dence," defending the Renslow decision and the ultimate disposition of
the Park case by the New York Court of Appeals in Becker.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Era of Nonliabiliy.
Although the history of the development of the concept that one
may be liable for injury to the unborn is an often-told tale," it forms
such an integral part of the analysis that it is necessarily a part of any
18. E.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Fowler
v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
19. E.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969); Carroll v. Sklofl, 415
Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
20. E.g., Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Poliquin v. MacDon-
ald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
21. As will be discussed below, see text accompanying notes 25-28 infra, the criminal law and
the laws pertaining to descent and distribution of property have acknowledged the separate exist-
ence of the unborn child from the moment of conception and the corresponding duty owed either
to the state (criminal law) or to the child (property) for its protection from an early age. Many
recent cases have predicated the existence of a cause of action in tort on the existence of life prior
to birth and the corresponding duty. See, e.g., Renslow, 67 Ill.2d at 355, 367 N.E.2d at 1254. But
seeid at 374, 367 N.E.2d at 1263 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (majority's conception of duty in that case
is "a tacit acceptance of causation as the sole determinant of liability").
22. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 9; Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine, and the Due
Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 233, 241-43 (1969); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child'
The Legal and LogicalInconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 354-60 (1971); Note, Recovery
for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a ChildAgainst Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK L. REv. 582, 583-90
(1976).
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discussion of the concept. If, in the process of retelling, any new in-
sights are developed, so much the better.
Any discussion of the history and background of the law of liabil-
ity in tort for injury to the unborn usually begins with the case of Die-
trich v. Northampton, 3 which appears to be the first reported case on
this subject in a common lawjurisdiction. As background for that case,
however, one should be aware of the common law in two other
fields-the criminal law and the law of property. Since most of the
early American cases referred to Coke and Blackstone as their authori-
ties on this subject,24 this brief excursion into the pre-Dietrich common
law may rest with some security on quotations from these early author-
ities.
The early common law recognized that the life of an unborn child
was entitled to the legal protection of the criminal law from the time it
stirred in its mother's womb. As stated by Coke in his Third Institute:
If a woman be quick with child and by a potion or other wise
killeth it in her womb, or if a man beat her, whereby the child dieth
in her body and she is delivered of a dead child, this is a great mispri-
sion, and no murder, but if the child be born alive and dieth of the
potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is ac-
counted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura when it is born
alive.
25
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, stated essentially the same con-
cept:
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in
every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an
infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick
with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if
any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is
delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the ancient
law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look
upon this offence in quite so atrocious a light, but merely as a very
heinous misdemeanor.26
As to the law of property he added:
An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is sup-
posed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a
legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate made to it. It may have a
guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to
it's [sic] use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were
23. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
24. See, e.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), overruled, Amann v.
Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 117 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
25. E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 50 (1792).
26. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-30.
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then actually born. And in this point the civil law agrees with ours.27
Although not stated by Blackstone, a further requirement in the law of
property was that the child be born alive.
28
With that legal background, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Dietrich refused to extend the criminal- and property-law precedents to
include a cause of action in tort. Apart from the lack of precedent,
which in his view was a substantial reason for denying a cause of ac-
tion, Justice Holmes had difficulty with the proposition that an infant
dying before it was able to live separate from its mother "could be said
to have become a person recognized by the law as capable of having a
locus standi in court, or being represented there by an administrator.
' '29
The factor which seemed finally persuasive to Holmes, however, was
that the unborn child "was a part of the mother at the time of the in-
jury, [and] any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered
for at all was recoverable by her. .... 30
Another influential early case was the Irish decision of Walker P.
Great Northern Railway of Ireland.' In sustaining a demurrer to a
claim against a common carrier for injury to a child en ventre sa Me're,
Chief Justice O'Brien reasoned that any duty to the child must flow
from the contract of carriage, and, since the existence of the child was
not known to the carrier, no duty could exist.32 Associate Justice
O'Brien agreed that the contract of carriage was for only one person,
but he also felt that there were additional reasons for denying recovery,
the principal one being the danger of indefinite and unknown expan-
sion of actions. His colorful and much-quoted language bears repeat-
ing:
What a field would be opened to extravagance of testimony, already
great enough-if Science could carry her lamp, not over certain in its
light where people have their eyes into the unseen laboratory of na-
ture-could profess to reveal the causes and things that are hidden
there-could trace a hare-lip to nervous shock, or a bunch of grapes
on the face to fright-could, in fact, make lusus naturae the same
thing as lusus scientiae .... The law is in some respects a stream
27. Id 130.
28. Knotts v. Steams, 91 U.S. 638 (1875); Detrick v. Migatt, 19 111. 146 (1857); The Earl of
Bedford's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 421 (1586); 3 WASHBURN ON REAL PROPERTY 16 (5th ed. 1887).
29. 138 Mass. at 16.
30. Id at 17.
31. 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1890).
32. Id at 79. Although the Irish court did not cite Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), it is interesting to speculate whether the court may have been influenced
by that case. The reader will recall that Winterbottom predicated liability in what would now be
called a "products liability" case on "privity." This "detour" from the mainstream of the develop-
ment of the law of negligence lasted in American jurisprudence until McPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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that gathers accretions with time from new relations and conditions.
But it is also a landmark that forbids advance on defined rights and
engagements; and if these are to be altered, if new rights and engage-
ments are to be created, that is the province of legislation and not of
decision.33
The next case to arise was Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,34 which
was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1900. In that case, the
plaintiff's mother, her pregnancy having gone its full term, had entered
the defendant hospital for the purpose of delivering the plaintiff. Ac-
cording to the complaint, the unborn child was seriously and perma-
nently disabled by a malfunctioning elevator in the hospital. In a per
curiam opinion that merely concurred in the views of the appellate
court which in turn had relied solely on Dietrich and Walker, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court denied that a cause of action existed. Allaire, al-
though one of the trilogy of prenatal injury cases upon whTch principal
reliance was placed for the next forty-six years, is also of major signifi-
cance because of the strong and well-reasoned dissent of Justice
Boggs.
35
After first providing a succinct essay on the nature and quality of
the common law and its unique ability to apply existing principles to
novel fact situations,36 Boggs found that the "governing principle" was
"that the common law, by way of damages, gave redress for personal
injuries inflicted by the wrong or neglect of another. '37 He then con-
cluded that the case was "embraced within the limits of the principle"
and "could have been maintained at common law unless the fact [that]
the plaintiff was unborn when the alleged injuries were inflicted would
have operated to deny a right of action."
38
Boggs then argued that the fact that the injuries were inflicted
prior to birth should not operate to deny a right of action. He asserted
that while a fetus might be regarded as part of its mother during the
early period of its gestation, once it became viable "it is but to deny a
palpable fact to argue there is but one life, and that the life of the
33. 28 L.R. Ir. at 81-82.
34. 184 IlL 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), overruled, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 117 N.E.2d 412
(1953).
35. 184 Il. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640. Justice Boggs' stance was subsequently adopted when
Allaire was overruled in 1953. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 117 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
36. The common law "would be an absurd science were it founded on precedents only." 184
Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640, (quoting I KENT COMMENTARIES 477 (13th ed. 1884)). "New and
peculiar cases must arise... for which the court must find the governing principle." 184 Ill. at
369, 56 N.E. at 641 (quoting T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 13 (1878)).
37. 184 Ill. at 369-70, 56 N.E. at 641.
38. Id at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.
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mother."39 After recognizing the common law rules applicable to the
unborn in criminal and property cases and the anomaly of denying
similar treatment in tort, Boggs added:
In the case at bar the infant, when the injury was inflicted, had, as the
declaration alleged, reached that advanced stage of foetal life which
would have, according to the medical learning of the age, endowed it
with such vitality and vigor, and with members and faculties so far
complete and mature, that it could have maintained independent life,
and the death of the mother would not have deprived it of life. It is
but natural justice that such an infant, if born alive, should be al-
lowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries so wrongly
committed upon its person while so in the womb of the mother."
Boggs distinguished Dietrich on the ground that the fetus in that
case had not reached the stage of viability. Likewise, Walker was not
pertinent because in that case the court could find no duty to a plaintiff
whose existence was unknown to the defendant common carrier. In the
present case, however, "the appellee hospital knew of the condition of
the mother, and of the existence of the plaintiff in her womb, con-
tracted with direct reference to the safety and care of both mother and
child, and received compensation for the performance of a duty to
both."4'
Boggs' persuasive plea was of little effect, however, and for the
next forty-six years the almost uninterrupted course of the law was to
deny a cause of action for prenatal injuries.4 2 Rhode Island joined the
parade in 1901, 4 1 Missouri in 191344 and Wisconsin in 1916.45 When
the New York Court of Appeals weighed in on the same side in
Drobner v. Peters,46 the fate of the injured unborn seemed to be sealed.
With hardly a dissenting voice,47 the courts of other jurisdictions, faced
39. Id
40. Id at 372, 56 N.E. at 641-42.
41. Id at 373, 56 N.E. at 642.
42. The rule in Dietrich was also followed in other common law jurisdictions outside of the
United States. See, e.g., Manns v. Carlon, [1940] Vict. L.R. 280 (Australia); Smith v. Fox, [1923] 3
D.L.R. 785 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1922) (Canada); Walker v. Great N. Ry. of Ire., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B.
1890) (Ireland).
43. Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901), overruled, Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I.
76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966).
44. Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913), overruled, Stegall v. Morris, 363
Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
45. Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
46. 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), overruled, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d
691 (1951). Cardozo dissented but did not write an opinion.
47. In addition to Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire, there were a few other dissenting voices.
In 1924, a trial court in Pennsylvania overruled a demurrer to a complaint alleging prenatal inju-
ries resulting in a child's birth I 1 days later with a physical deformity. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa.
D. & C. 227 (1924). The court in Kine recognized that it was acting without precedent in Penn-
sylvania and against the weight of authority in other jurisdictions but nevertheless upheld a cause
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with a claim for damages by a living infant for prenatal injuries or for
wrongful death of an infant from prenatal injuries, followed suit.
48
The American Law Institute adopted the view of this overwhelming
majority and provided in the Restatement of Torts that "[a] person who
negligently causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to such child
for the harm. 49
The tenacity of the courts in clinging to precedents denying causes
of action for injuries to the unborn until the middle of the twentieth
century is surprising in light of the advances in medical knowledge that
were occurring during this period." Although the denial of a right of
recovery for prenatal injuries on the theory that "the unborn child was
a part of the mother"51 may have been in accord with the state of medi-
cal knowledge in 1884,52 by the late 1920s, or certainly in the 1930s and
early 1940s, when the courts of Alabama,53 Texas,54 Michigan,-5 New
of action on several grounds: the analogy to the criminal and property law; the modern scientific
fact that a fetus has a separate existence from the mother (an independent circulatory system); and
the invalidity and want of persuasiveness of the reasons against recovery cited by the New York
Court of Appeals in Drobner. In Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn. 320, 206 N.W. 650 (1925), without
any discussion of whether the injuries occurred prior to the plaintiff's birth, the court affirmed a
jury damage award to an infant injured by the attending physician's negligence during delivery.
See Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 459, 26 A.2d 489, 684 (1942) (Brogan, C.J., dissenting),
overruled, Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960). See authorities cited at note 6
supra.
The most eloquent appeal for a more humane and rational approach to the issue of liability
for prenatal injuries was sounded by the Supreme Court of Canada in Montreal Tramways v.
Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337. See text accompanying notes 61-62 infra.
48. A summary of the status of the law in American jurisdictions on these two issues shortly
after the Bonbrest decision is contained in 10 A.L.R.2d 639 (1950) and 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950).
49. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 869 (1939). The comment emphasized that the section was
applicable only to unintentional harms, and an explanatory note stated that the Institute took no
position upon the question of liability for intentional or reckless injuries to mother or child.
50. Of course, legal science cannot be a slave to medical science any more than it can be to
philosophy, logic or theology. Thus, separate legal existence need not correspond to separate
biological existence. Factors such as causation, lack of precedent, difficulties of proof and the
danger of spurious and conjectural claims, all of which were assigned at one time or another as
reasons for denial of a cause of action for prenatal injuries, see text accompanying notes 11-14
supra, are appropriate for consideration in determining whether a living thing should be consid-
ered as separate for the purpose of creating a duty in others to protect it from wrongful injury. On
the other hand, courts cannot remain oblivious to advances in medical knowledge-as the tort
decisions following Dietrich seem to have done.
51. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).
52. But see the abortion resolution passed by the American Medical Association in 1859 as
quoted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 141-42 (1973).
53. Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926), overuled, Hus-
key v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So.2d 596 (1972).
54. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935),
overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 419 S.W.2d 820 (1967).
55. Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937), overruled, Womack v. Buchhorn,
384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
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Jersey,56 Pennsylvania 57 and Ohio58 faced the issue as one of first im-
pression, this could no longer be said to be true. Standard medical
works of the period recognized the separate biological existence of the
fetus,5 9 and an impressive body of medical knowledge concerning the
effect of the prenatal environment on the unborn human fetus was ac-
cumulating.6 ° This growth of medical knowledge should have ex-
ploded not only the no-separate-existence belief but also should have
quieted the fears of those jurists who were wary of the possibility of
speculative and conjectural claims and of the difficulties of proving
causation. In fact, the state of medical knowledge at that time was such
that the term "fiction" could more aptly have been applied to the vari-
ous courts' continued denial of separate existence of the fetus than to
what Holmes in Dietrich said was the "fiction" of separate existence
indulged in by the common law concerning criminal responsibility and
property rights.
The legal-as opposed to the medical-infirmity of the Holmes
position was pointed out dramatically in Montreal Tramways v.
56. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942), overruled, Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Ryan v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14
A.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Chief Justice Brogan in dissent sharply criticized the Die/rich case and
the majority's reliance on Dietrich on the ground that it was decided on a wrong factual basis-
that is, that the fetus is a part of the mother. 128 N.J.L. at 465-66, 26 A.2d at 686-87.
57. Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940), which apparently overruled, sub
silentio, Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924). See note 47 supra.
58. Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943).
59. Although the term "separate biological existence" was not used in the medical literature
of the time, standard medical texts on obstetrics, gynecology, embryology and morphology were in
agreement on the basic biological facts of the early development of the human embryo and fetus.
According to that literature, the fertilized ovum lives off its surroundings for the first few days
after conception. At about the fifth or sixth day it is implanted in the uterus. The embryo remains
nonvascular through the third week, but in the fourth week its heart begins to beat, suggesting the
beginning of blood circulation. At this point, although the fetus remains dependent on the mother
for nourishment until its birth, its bodily functions may be said to be independent of those of the
mother, giving the fetus a separate biological existence. See, e.g., J. DELEE & J. GREENHILL,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS 40-41 (8th ed. 1943); M. GILBERT, BIOGRAPHY OF THE
UNBORN 12,24, 25-26 (1938); W. HAMILTON, J. BOYD & H. MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 87
(1947); 0. HERTWIG, TEXTBOOK OF THE EMBRYOLOGY OF MAN AND MAMMALS 260 (5th ed.
1912); MORRIs' HUMAN ANATOMY 33-36, 47 (C. Jackson ed. 1925); Patten & Hartman, The Early
Development ofthe Emyryo, in 1 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 401 (A. Curtis ed. 1933).
The unborn infant goes through several developmental stages before reaching the stage tech-
nically denominated a "fetus" (e.g., zygote, morula, embryo). For simplicity, however, the term
"fetus" is used in this Article to refer to the unborn infant at all stages of development.
60. This new medical knowledge included discoveries of the correlation between birth de-
fects and the incidence of rubella, the Rh-factor, radiation, vitamin deficiencies, thyroid and io-
dine deficiencies, oxygen deficiency, mechanical impact and the toxoplasm organism. See L.
AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 12-14, 155-56, 166, 172-74 (5th ed. 1947); D. MURPHY, CON-
GENITAL MALFORMATIONS 66-83 (1940).
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Leveille,6' in which the Canadian Supreme Court, though deciding the
case principally on the basis of the civil law of Quebec, carefully con-
sidered the common law precedents. It stated:
If a child after birth has no right of action for pre-natal injuries,
we have a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy, for, although
the father may be entitled to compensation for the loss he has in-
curred and the mother for what she has suffered, yet there is a resid-
uum of injury for which compensation cannot be had save at the suit
of the child. If a right of action be denied to the child it will be
compelled, without any fault on its part, to go through life carrying
the seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infir-
mity and inconvenience without any compensation therefor. To my
mind it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable,
should be allowed to maintain an action in the Courts for injuries
wrongfully committed upon its person while in the womb of its
mother.
62
B. The Recognition of Liabiliy.
Despite the force and logic of the Canadian Court's opinion in
Montreal Tramways in 1933, it fell to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia more than a decade later to rescue this
area of compensation law from the strictures that had bound it since
Dietrich. The case was Bonbrest v. Kotz, 63 in which a living infant as-
serted a "right of action springing from the alleged fact it was taken
from its mother's womb through professional malpractice, with resul-
tant consequences of a detrimental character. '64 The question was a
novel one in the District of Columbia, and Judge McGuire therefore
was not bound by the overwhelming weight of authority in other juris-
dictions. While acknowledging Holmes' famous dictum that "[t]he life
of the law has been not [sic] logic; it has been experience,"65 Judge
McGuire was persuaded that blind adherence to authority could not
prevail against the medical knowledge of the time and that the unas-
sailable logic of Montreal Tramways dictated the extension of the legal
principle to parallel the progress made in science and medicine since
1884. As a result, he found that the duty of the physicians-"employed
as the defendants were in this case to attend, in their professional ca-
pacities, both the mother and child"66- extended to the afterborn child
61. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
62. Id at 345.
63. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
64. Id at 139.
65. Id at 142 (emphasis added by court) (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW Lecture 1,
(1881)).
66. 65 F. Supp. at 142.
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for injuries inflicted upon it before its birth but while it was viable.
Just as the Dietrich rule had been followed almost without dissent
in the ensuing years, Bonbrest received almost immediate and uniform
acceptance by the courts of other jurisdictions. Within three years, the
Ohio Supreme Court upheld a cause of action on behalf of an infant
born with permanent disabilities allegedly resulting from injuries re-
ceived while a viable fetus.6 7 In the same year, the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized a cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn
viable fetus.6 8 Two years later the New York Court of Appeals over-
ruled Drobner v. Peters6 9 in a decision upholding a cause of action for
negligent injuries sustained by an infant in its mother's womb in the
ninth month of pregnancy.7° With one of the principal citadels of the
no-cause-of-action principle breached, the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions followed in an almost unbroken chain.7
The road to recovery for unborn plaintiffs was not an easy one.
Nor was it without sharp turns and twists as the courts worked out a
conceptual framework to support recovery after more than half a cen-
tury of blind adherence to the precepts of Dietrich. When denial of a
cause of action was automatic for any prenatal injuries, courts did not
have to face the more subtle issues posed as recovery was allowed. The
early post-Bonbrest cases involved viable fetuses; in cases of both
wrongful death and of injuries resulting in post-birth disabilities these
early decisions-either expressly or by implication-limited their
holdings to injuries to a viable fetus. 2 Within a few years, however,
the illogic,73 lack of factual medical support74 and injustice 75 of this
restriction became apparent, and most courts eliminated the require-
ment of viability in injury cases, requiring only that a causal connec-
tion between injury and damage be shown.76 Further, when denial of a
67. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
68. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
69. 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
70. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). The infant was permanently
disabled.
71. See text accompanying note 5 supra. Subsequent to Bonbrest, the courts of at least two
jurisdictions handed down decisions clinging to earlier denial-of-recovery precedents. Bliss v.
Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Estate of Powers v. Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 156
N.W.2d 530 (1968). These have subsequently been overruled. Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc.,
340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971).
72. See, e.g. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v.
Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691
(1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
73. See Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
74. See Id; Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
75. See Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
76. Eg., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Daley v.
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right of recovery was automatic, the courts did not have to distinguish
in logic or in law between the wrongful death cause of action and the
disability-producing injury case. Once liability was recognized, how-
ever, the issue of live birth became one of preeminent importance in
wrongful death actions, and it continues to be a source of disparate
treatment in different jurisdictions. The so-called "wrongful life"
causes of action have recently been sources of litigation and promise to
increase in frequency.
Courts have yet to grapple with a number of issues that are certain
to be raised in the near future. These may include the right of action of
the unborn against its mother for failure to provide a healthful prenatal
environment, when, for example, the mother is a drug addict, an alco-
holic or an habitual and heavy smoker;7 7 the right of action against the
mother for a botched self-abortion attempt resulting in temporary or
permanent disability of the child;78 or the right of action against a par-
ent with a known genetic defect for causing the birth of a child with the
same genetic defect.79 Further, some courts have had difficulty in har-
monizing the developing law of tort-in which the separate existence
and personality of the fetus for the purpose of maintaining a tort cause
of action has been increasingly recognized-with the current law of
abortion in which the life of the fetus (at least until viability) is
subordinated to the mother's right of privacy."0 These divergent trends
may lead to anomalies such as existed pre-Bonbrest between criminal
and property cases and tort cases. Although no attempt will be made to
provide answers to all of these undecided questions, this Article will
analyze the existing cases in such a way that the framework that
emerges may provide some coherent basis for approaching new issues
as they appear.
II. TOWARD A COHERENT THEORY OF LIABILITY
The device of the common law for placing a limitation on tort lia-
bility, particularly liability for negligence, is the concept of duty.
Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960).
77. The possibility of a cause of action in such cases was examined in Note, SUFFOLK L.
REV., supra note 22.
78. Readers will recall the highly publicized case of Marla Pritchard, who was tried and
acquitted in Kentucky for the gruesome death of her unborn child as a result of her inept attempt
at self-abortion. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 31, 1978, at 1, col. 2. Had the outcome been a living but
deformed child, would the child have had a cause of action against its mother?
79. To date, actions for such recovery have been against physicians who have allegedly negli-
gently failed to prevent birth (by sterilization, contraception or abortion) where a genetic defect
was probable. See text accompanying notes 244-88 infra.
80. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Whether expressed in the Paisgraf foreseeable-plaintiff formula,8' the
much-criticized Polemis formula of direct consequences to the injured
person,8" the Wagon Mound I1 foreseeability-of-the-risk test 83 or the
manifold, all-purpose formulations proposed by other courts and schol-
ars of the common-law system,84 the concept of "duty" is the way the
common law makes the policy determination of how far liability shall
extend. Since this is a policy delimitation, it is always a question for
the judge; when he determines that there is no "duty" he is, in the
words of Holmes, saying that "the law does not spread its protection so
far.,"
8 5
In the pre-Bonbrest cases, then, the courts were saying, for reasons
sufficient under the prevailing state of medical knowledge, social and
economic mores, and shared notions of what was right and just, that
the protection of the law should not spread so far as to protect against
injuries to the unborn. The line of duty so drawn was clear, simple and
thus easy to apply. Yet when the courts became ready to acknowledge
that this duty boundary had been drawn too narrowly-that it was in-
consistent with current medical knowledge and changing societal views
of justice-a new outer boundary had to be found, one that not only
would accommodate these changes, but also would fit within one of the
traditional legal formulas. Under these circumstances, courts naturally
proceeded cautiously so that in the process of extending the boundaries
of duty they would avoid the creation of unlimited liability. Initially,
courts drew the line at the concept of viability.8"
A. The Requirement of Viability.
Since the pre-Bonbrest cases rested on the theory that a fetus has
no existence separate from its mother and thus no duty toward such a
"nonexistent" being could arise, it was to be expected that the early
post-Bonbrest decisions should find a duty most clearly in those cases
in which the fetus was viable-that is, where it had reached the stage of
development where life could be maintained outside the mother's
womb. 7 In these cases, the "personhood" and separate existence of the
81. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
82. In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
83. Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. [1966] 2 All E.R. 709 (P.C.).
84. See, e.g., Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883) (foreseeability of harm to
plaintiff); Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 (Scot.) (closely and directly affected plaintiff).
See generally Prosser, PafsgrafRevisited, 52 MIcH. L. RE. 1 (1953).
85. This insight is from the splendid article of Professor Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negli-
gence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (1961).
86. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
87. See note 9 supra.
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child were most clearly apparent, and courts could most readily find a
duty of care. Such a duty was found by courts deciding both the claims
of surviving infants seeking damages for disabilities resulting from pre-
natal injuries8 ("injury" cases) and the wrongful death actions of sur-
vivors of infants born alive but subsequently dying as a result of
prenatal injuries.89
Since most early cases allowing recovery involved a viable fetus, it
is difficult to conclude whether the courts were stating a rule that lim-
ited recovery only to cases in which the fetus was viable at the time of
the injury or whether they were merely limiting their holdings to the
facts before them.90 As new and increasingly diverse fact situations
were litigated, however, it became apparent that the viability-at-time-
of-injury criterion made little practical, legal or medical sense in injury
cases. The rubella cases suggest the illogic of such a rule.
Rubella- or German measles-is a relatively mild contagious dis-
ease, which, when contracted by either children or adults, produces
only minor unpleasantness during its acute stage and normally no per-
manent harm whatever. Some cases are of such low order that the
adult contracting the disease does not display any clinical symptoms.9'
When contracted by a mother in the early months of pregnancy, how-
ever, the effects on the fetus can be devastating. These effects are prob-
ably the best-documented example of postnatal disability resulting
from prenatal harm.92 The more commonly caused disabilities include
eye defects, hearing losses and heart defects.93 Correlation between ru-
bella in the first trimester of pregnancy and postnatal disabilities is
88. See, e.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951);
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102
N.E.2d 691 (1951); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
89. See, e.g., Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153
Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
90. In Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951), the court
placed emphasis on the fact that the child was "fully developed," but as clarified in Hornbuckle v.
Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956), the holding was not limited to cases
in which injuries occurred after the unborn infant had reached that stage of development. Simi-
larly, in Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957), the New Hampshire Supreme
Court apparently established viability at the time of injury as a criterion, but only a year later in
Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958), dropped viability at the time of injury as a
prerequisite, at least for a child born alive and suffering permanent damage from the prenatal
injury.
91. Avery, Monif, Sever & Leikin, Rubella Syndrome After Inapparent MaternalIllness, 110
AM. J. OF DIsEASEs OF CHILDREN 444 (1965).
92. See, e.g., Heggie, Rubella: Current Concepts in Epidemiology and Teratology, 13 PED.
CLINIC OF N. AMERICA 251 (1966); Kalodner, Obstetric Problems Associated with Rubella, in Ru-
BELLA 123 (H. Friedman & J. Prier eds. 1973).
93. Heggie, supra note 92, at 251.
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high,94 and, subject to such considerations as the parents' religious,
moral, social or philosophic beliefs, therapeutic abortion is often rec-
ommended when contraction of rubella by the mother during this criti-
cal period is medically confirmed.95 The apparent cause of the damage
to the fetus is the attack upon the cell-growth process by the virus,
which is transmitted through the bloodstream to the placenta and
thence to the fetus. The greatest effect is on the three- to eight-week old
fetus, since this is the critical period of organ development.
96
Similar effects on the early-stage fetus can be caused by a number
of phenomena, including trauma, other diseases, drugs and perhaps
even emotional distress. 97 Since essentially all of the vital organs take
form at a very early stage of fetal life, the most serious postnatal disa-
bilities result from injuries occurring in the first trimester of preg-
nancy-long before viability.98 From a medical point of view,
therefore, it makes little sense to condition recovery on the viability of
the fetus at the time of injury. The question courts have had to resolve
is whether the results of this increased medical knowledge can be trans-
lated into a suitable formulation of duty upon which tort liability can
be predicated.
The pre-Bonbrest cases, in essence, amounted to statements that
one did not owe a duty of care to someone who would not come into
full existence until sometime in the future-someone who, at the time
of the infliction of the injury, was not an independent "person." 99 In
the early post-Bonbrest cases, the requirement of viability permitted the
retention of personhood as the predicate of an existence of duty, since a
94. L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, supra note 9, at 810.
95. Doctors as well as parents have been troubled by the question of which cases are "appro-
priate" for abortion. If the incidence of postnatal deformity or disability is 20%, then abortion will
result in killing four healthy fetuses for every defective one. As stated by one eminent obstetrician:
For the woman who contracts rubella in the first trimester of pregnancy, the risk of
bearing a child with serious congenital defects is increased by a factor of five. To many
physicians and patients this risk has been unacceptable, and pregnancies have been ter-
minated by medical intervention. To others the risk has seemed insufficient to justify
such an approach. Social, psychologic, and religious considerations are involved ...
Prerequisite to consideration of therapeutic abortion should be the certainty that (1)
the patient had rubella, and (2) that it occurred during the first trimester.
Heggie, supra note 92, at 261.
96. Marshall, The Clinical Impact ofIntrauterine Rubella, in INTRAUTERINE INFECTIONS 3, 4
(1973).
97. The correlation between emotional distress in the first trimester and birth defects has
been suggested by several studies. See, e.g., Drillien & Wilkinson, Emotional Stress and Mango.
loidBirths, 6 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 140 (1964).
98. Heggie, supra note 92, at 255; Marshall, sura note 96, at 4.
99. E.g., Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935),
overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (1967).
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viable fetus has the capacity to live outside the womb.100 When asked
to extend the duty to injuries occurring prior to viability, however, the
courts had to find some basis other than personhood to support a duty.
Clearly, medical knowledge had by this time convinced jurists that a
fetus, from shortly after conception, is a separate biological organ-
ism. 01 Further, as we have seen, medical knowledge also suggested
that events in the first trimester were more damaging to fetuses than
those occurring at a later time. But whether liability was based on an
independent duty to this "separate organism"'1 2 or on a contingent
duty that matured when the infant was born alive10 3 has never been
made clear in many jurisdictions. Without detailed discussion of the
scope of duty owed the unborn, the courts justified recovery on various
other grounds.' °4
Notwithstanding the variety of rationales, no court which origi-
nally granted a living child a cause of action for prenatal injuries while
the child was viable has subsequently denied such a cause of action for
injuries occurring prior to viability.0 5 Although the decisional law in a
few jurisdictions suggests that viability at the time of injury remains a
requirement for recovery,0 6 it is probable that these cases have lost
their vitality, remaining as apparent authority only because no case
100. See, eg., Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
101. See Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
102. Id at 485, 147 A.2d at 110; Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696,
697 (1953). See also Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960) ("distinct
entity"); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960) ("separate creature").
103. The case which most clearly predicates liability on a contingent duty is an Australian
case, Watt v. Rama, [1972] Vict. 353 (Sup. Ct. Vict. Austl. 1971). See also Endresz v. Friedberg,
24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969). See text accompanying notes 176-85
infra.
104. See, e.g., Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (the
injustice of not permitting recovery; a manifest wrong should not go without redress); Womack v.
Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971) (following the "overwhelming weight
ofjudicial authority"); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) (the desirability of
bringing the law of torts into symmetry with property and criminal law); Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (the rejection of the spurious-claim rationale of denying recovery);
Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966) (the right of a child to begin life without
physical or mental disabilities resulting from the wrongful acts of another prior to birth); Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962) (the rejection of the rationale of
denying recovery due to the difficulties of proof of causation).
105. Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth, J., dissent-
ing).
106. See, e.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 442, 79 A.2d 550, 562 (1951) (Hender-
son, J., concurring); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (1953). In Tursi
v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955), the court held
that viability was a requirement for recovery for prenatal injury. The same court recently rejected
that rule. Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (Super. Ct. 1977). The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court apparently has not spoken on the issue.
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posing the issue of liability for previability injuries has yet reached the
appellate courts of those jurisdictions. It appears that the viability rule
is dead in causes of action for prenatal injuries brought by living in-
fants.
The same cannot be said for wrongful death actions. In these
cases the requirement of viability appears to have survived. This can
be explained principally by the fact that wrongful death actions are
creatures of statute'0 7 and courts have been restricted by the language
of the wrongful death statute of the particular jurisdiction. Most
wrongful death statutes create a cause of action for the death of a "per-
son"'0 8 and usually require that the defendant would have been liable
if the death of the person had not ensued.'0 9 The nearness of the injury
to a viable fetus to the time of normal birth and the fetus' ability to
survive outside its mother's womb have thus been persuasive factors for
courts in considering whether a fetus which dies before birth is a "per-
son" whose death may be compensated under the wrongful death stat-
ute. 0
If one accepts the proposition that a wrongful death action should
be allowed for the death of an unborn fetus,"' then the logic of requir-
ing viability at the time of death is apparent. Viability is what makes
the fetus a "person" within most courts' construction of the wrongful
death statutes. But does it follow that the injury causing the death must
also have occurred when the fetus is viable? As we have seen, the most
107. Although it is recognized that Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
has cast doubt on the historical accuracy of this statement, it is nevertheless accepted for the
purpose of this analysis, since, except in Massachusetts, Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284
N.E.2d 222 (1972), the belief that a common law action for wrongful death would not lie was so
widely held that it may be presumed that both courts and legislators have acted on this basis. See
Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 574, 565 P.2d 122, 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1977).
108. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 10-7-1 (1970). The statutes of a few states use other terms. Eg., ALA. CODE tit. 6, ch. 5, § 391
("minor child"); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967) ("decedent').
Whatever the term used, however, the meaning conveyed is "legal person." Therefore, when the
term "person" is used hereafter in this connection, it should be construed to mean the statutory
term used in the statute of the particular jurisdiction involved.
109. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1974); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2922 (West 1968); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 10-7-1 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Hale v.
Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); O'Neill
v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38
N.W.2d 838 (1949); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Fowler v. Wood-
ward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975).
111. See text accompanying notes 117-85 infra for an argument against acceptance of this
proposition.
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serious injuries to a fetus are likely to occur during the very early stages
of its existence. If instead of causing either a spontaneous abortion, for
which there would be no right of recovery for wrongful death because
of the nonviability of the fetus at time of death, or a postnatal deform-
ity or disability, for which recovery would be allowed, the previability
injury causes stillbirth after the fetus becomes viable, should not a right
of action for wrongful death exist? Unfortunately, the decided cases
give us no answer. Most reported cases have involved fetuses which
were viable both at the time of the injury and at the time of death." 2
The few courts that have allowed recovery for death following
previability injury have based the decision either on a complete aban-
donment of the viability criterion for wrongful death actions 1 3 or on
the acceptance of an allegation of viability even when the facts ap-
peared to be otherwise." 4
In principle, however, there is as much reason to allow a cause of
action in cases involving previability injury and postviability death as
there is in those involving postviability injury and postviability death.
The traditional objections asserted to bar recovery-the speculative na-
ture of the injury, the possibility of spurious claims, the difficulty of
proof and the tenuousness of the causal chain-should be no more
difficult to overcome in a wrongful death action than in an injury ac-
tion. While viability at the time of death might be a requirement of
statutory "personhood," no such statutory requirement exists as to per-
sonhood at the time of the injury.
One of the more thoughtful analyses of the irrelevance of viability
at the time of injury is contained in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Haynsworth in Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co. "I After disposing of
the various arguments advanced in favor of maintaining the viability
criterion, he concluded:
Treatment of viability at the time of injury as significant is a relic of a
relatively modem misunderstanding. When Mr. Justice Holmes
wrote for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1884 he
advanced as one reason for not allowing recovery for prenatal inju-
112. See authorities cited at note 110 supra.
113. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) (recovery for death of fetus
which was "quick"); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) (distinction
between viable and nonviable fetuses abandoned).
114. Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La. App. 1951) ("viable" fetus of
two to four months).
115. 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964). Judge Haynsworth later withdrew his notation of dissent in
the case when, in a subsequent opinion, Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the live birth of a viable fetus-the point on
which Judge Haynsworth had dissented-was not a criterion for maintenance of a wrongful death
action. 341 F.2d at 83.
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ries the notion that, until birth, the child was a part of its mother.
That notion was inconsistent with what common law precedents
there were and with medical facts as they are known today. Its ex-
pression, however, led those taking the first hesitant steps away from
Dietrich to say with understandable restraint that a viable child, at
least, was not a part of its mother. Since we now know that a child is
no more a part of its mother before viability than after, this relic of
an invalid notion does not deserve preservation. Our steps away
from Dietrich need no longer be hesitant.' 6
If these arguments are accepted, the concept of viability does not pro-
vide meaningful assistance in determining the limits of duty with re-
spect to prenatal injuries.
B. The Requirement of Live birth.
In the two areas of the early common law in which the separate
existence of an unborn child was recognized-property and criminal
law-the rights of the unborn child to the protection of the law ma-
tured only upon live birth." 7 In tort cases in which the live infant is
suing for postnatal harm resulting from prenatal injuries, live birth is
obviously not an issue, since the living child himself is the person on
whose behalf the action is brought.
Live birth is an issue in the wrongful death case. Before address-
ing that category of cases, however, it may be worthwhile to consider
briefly a problem which no adjudicated cases have addressed. If an
unborn infant, injured in its mother's womb, is later miscarried or still-
born from a totally unrelated cause, should there be recovery on behalf
of the child for its injuries? The problem of dealing with such a case
conceptually may illuminate some of the difficulties posed by allowing
a cause of action in wrongful death actions for fetuses not born ailive.
The principal difficulty in analyzing a possible cause of action by a
dead fetus for injuries which were not the cause of death is the problem
of establishing one element of negligence-harm or detriment-which
is compensable in damages."' If a fetus has never lived outside its
mother's womb, is it possible to assess the harm it has suffered? In the
absence of pecuniary loss, the two principal elements for which mone-
tary damages are awarded to living infants for prenatal harm are disa-
bility or deformity and pain and suffering. If the fetus dies before
birth, it has not had to live with its handicap. Compensation for this
116. Id at 79 (footnotes omitted). Although at this point Judge Haynsworth was speaking of
an action for injury resulting in postnatal harm rather than death of the fetus, it is clear from his
opinion that he would have applied the same logic to a wrongful death action.
117. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
118. SeeW. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971).
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element, therefore, seems entirely inappropriate.
The second possible element of damages is somewhat more diffi-
cult to analyze. Although medical authorities tell us that unborn in-
fants experience "fetal distress,"' 9 is this the equivalent of "pain and
suffering"? One difficulty we face in answering this question is the in-
ability of medical authorities to define pain. 120 In spite of the lack of
agreement on a precise definition, the authorities seem to agree that.it
has two components: the original sensation and the reaction to it.1
2 '
Medical science also tells us that as early as ten weeks of gestation the
nervous system of an unborn infant is sufficiently developed to allow it
to respond to local stimuli.12 2 By the end of the third month, stroking
the lips causes the fetus to respond by sucking and stroking the eyelids
provokes a reflex response.' 23 Even at this early stage the fetus appears
to have the capacity to fulfill both components of the definition of
pain-to note the sensation and to react to it. But a mere motor reac-
tion to stimuli seems an insufficient basis for the award of legal dam-
ages. Until more is known concerning fetal sensations, any award of
damages based on pain and suffering would be based on mere conjec-
ture and speculation.
24
119. "Fetal distress" is defined as "a threatening or adverse condition of the fetus, caused by
stress; some of the criteria for recognition of fetal distress are cardiac arrhythmia, bradycardia,
tachycardia, passage of meconium." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 416 (23d ed. 1976).
120. "[A]Ithough the meaning of the word is understood, at least in a general sense, it defies
exact definition. Working definitions have been proposed, but they invariably rely, at least in
part, on illustration or example rather than objective description." M. SWERDLOW, RELIEF OF
INTRACTABLE PAIN 10 (1974) See Endel, "Psychogenic"Pain andthe Pain-Prone Patient, 26 AM. J.
OF MED. 899 (1959).
121. Endel, supra note 120, at 899.
122. Such responses may include squinting, opening the mouth, incomplete finger closure and
planter flexion of the toes. L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, supra note 9, at 223.
123. K. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN 83 (1977).
124. Only two judicial opinions have been discovered which address this question even ob-
liquely. The first is that of Judge Haynsworth, who, in his'dissenting opinion in Todd, stated:
Little can be said in favor of allowance of a cause of action for personal injury to a
child en ventre sa mere, which thereafter is stillborn for some other unrelated reason.
When the stillbirth is unrelated to the prenatal injury, the child suffers no economic loss,
and it is, at least, highly dubious that it will have endured conscious pain and suffering.
341 F.2d at 80 (footnote omitted). The second is Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d
42 (1964), in which the Supreme Court of South Carolina used language which suggests that
recovery might be allowed:
Once the concept of the unborn, viable child is accepted, we have no difficulty in
holding that a cause of action for tortious injury to such a child arises immediately upon
the infliction of the injury. It is beside the point that the extent of damages might be
difficult, or even impossible to establish prior to birth. Indeed, the injurious conse-
quences of a prenatal injury might not become manifest until long after birth, but this
would not affect the existence of the cause of action from the time ofthe wrong, nor the
character of the wrongful act as one entitling the child to recover damages therefor.
Id at 613, 138 S.E.2d at 44 (emphasis added). If the South Carolina court is saying that an
imperfect or incomplete cause of action arises when the injury occurs, to be made complete when
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The cases in which the issue of live birth has actually arisen, how-
ever, have been wrongful death actions.' 25 Under the statutes of most
jurisdictions such actions, though dependent on the decedent's right to
sue if he had survived, are for the purpose of compensating the survi-
vors for the loss they have suffered because of the death.
Several different factual situations may be visualized in which the
death of an infant may be made the subject of a wrongful death action.
The unborn infant may receive an injury while in its mother's womb
from which it dies instantaneously or within a very short time. Or the
fetus may receive an injury which is not immediately fatal but which
causes its death prior to normal birth. Or it may receive an injury prior
to birth which proves fatal after some period of postnatal life.'26
Courts in the United States have faced all of those situations and have
not always resolved them in a way that is completely satisfying from
the point of view of symmetry and logic.
The first reported post-Bonbrest case involving the death of an un-
born child appears to be Verkennes v. Corniea,27 in which the court
the child is born alive and the extent of its defect or disability can be measured in the usual terms
of economic loss and pain and suffering, then the statement cannot be faulted. On the other hand,
if the statement is meant to be taken literally-that it is "beside the point" that it is "impossible"
to establish damages-then the court is suggesting that the lack of a basic element does not affect
the existence of a cause of action in the tort of negligence. Such a suggestion is unacceptable. In
negligence actions, at least, injury must produce harm which is compensable in damages to create
liability. If the element of harm cannot be proven, then the cause of action fails.
Although a number of other courts have used language broad enough to embrace the cause of
action visualized, it is clear that they were limiting the context of their words to the issue before
them. See, e.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (1950); Presley v.
Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 188-89, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976).
125. Except for a wrongful death action, only one other situation can be visualized in which
prenatal injuries to an infant not born alive might be a basis for a cause of action. Where an
insurance policy covers the risk of injury or death of the "person" injured or killed, a contractual
claim might be upheld. This issue has been addressed in at least two reported cases. In the first of
these, Peterson v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 551, 197 N.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 853 (1964), the Ohio Supreme Court held that a five-and-one-half month old fetus, whose
mother miscarried as a result of an automobile accident and which lived for 21 hours after birth,
was a "person" within the meaning of the term "any person who suffers bodily injury . . . or
death" within the family-compensation clause of the automobile insurance policy issued to the
infant's father by the defendant. The court's opinion suggests that the live birth of the infant was
a prerequisite for the cause of action, but Ohio's position among those jurisdictions not requiring
live birth in wrongful death actions, see note 130 infra, indicates that the result might have been
the same if the baby had been stillborn. In the second case, Orange v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a viable unborn
child, which was stillborn as a result of injuries it received in an auto accident involving its preg-
nant mother, was not only a "person" but also was a member of the "family" or "household" of
the expectant father, thus subject to the exclusionary clause of the family auto insurance policy.
126. Although injuries inflicted during the process of delivery could be considered separately,
they appear to be legally indistinguishable from other prenatal injuries and are so treated here.
127. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
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held that a claim alleging that the death of an unborn child during
delivery was caused by the negligence of the defendants stated a cause
of action under the Minnesota wrongful death statute. Relying princi-
pally on Montreal Tramways, Bonbrest and Justice Boggs' dissent in
Allaire, and without making any attempt to distinguish a wrongful
death case from one in which a living infant was suing for postnatal
effects of prenatal injuries, the court concluded:
We hold that under the wrongful-death statute the action here will
lie. Its language is clear. Thereunder, a cause of action arises when
death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, and the
personal representative of the decedent may maintain such action on
behalf of the next of kin of decedent. It seems too plain for argument
that where independent existence is possible and life is destroyed
through a wrongful act a cause of action arises under the statutes
cited.1
2 8
Despite the hope expressed by one commentator that Verkennes
would be ignored by future courts, 2 9 the rule enunciated in that case,
requiring no live birth, rapidly took hold and today represents the ma-
jority rule.13
0
128. Id at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
129. Gordon, supra note 9, at 595.
130. The author's research suggests that as many as 25 jurisdictions have no requirement of
live birth while 12 now require live birth as a prerequisite in wrongful death actions. Although
some of the decisions are not fully definitive- either because the point was not directly at issue or
because the court of last resort has not yet spoken-a tabulation of the decisions on which these
comparisons are based is included for the convenience of the reader:
a. Jurisdictions having no live-birth requirement in wrongful death actions:
1. Alabama: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354 (1974).
2. Connecticut: Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (Super.
Ct. 1966); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct.
1962).
3. Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557
(Super. Ct. 1956).
4. District of Columbia: Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C.
1971).
5. Georgia: Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
6. Illinois: Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
7. Indiana: Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971).
8. Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962).
9. Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955).
10. Louisiana: Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La. App.
1951); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
11. Maryland: State ex rel Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964).
12. Massachusetts: Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975).
13. Michigan: O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971).
14. Minnesota: Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
15. Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954).
16. Nevada: White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969).
17. New Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
18. Ohio: Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
19. Oklahoma: Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976).
20. Oregon: Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974).
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In reaching their decisions, courts rejecting the live-birth rule have
relied on a variety of grounds. The essential one, since wrongful death
actions are almost uniformly considered to be statutory in origin,13 1 is
that a viable, unborn child is a "person" within the meaning of the
state's wrongful death statute. In reasoning that an unborn fetus is a
"person," the courts have used the following arguments:
(1) It is incongruous to allow a cause of action to a live infant
injured prior to birth but to deny it to one whose injury was so severe
that it died from it. The effect of the live-birth requirement is to permit
the tortfeasor inflicting the greatest injury to avoid liability. 
32
(2) Allowing an action is in accord with the weight of current
authority.
133
(3) The difficulty of proof of causation of death-producing injury
is no greater than the difficulty of proof in cases involving disability-
producing injury to infants who survive.
34
21. Rhode Island: Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976).
22. South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
23. Washington: Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975).
24. West Virginia: Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971).
25. Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148
N.W.2d 107 (1967).
b. Jurisdictions having a live-birth requirement in wrongful death actions:
1. Arizona: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1975).
2. California: Justus y. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1977).
3. Florida: Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
4. Iowa: McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971).
5. Missouri: State ex rel Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976).
6. Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
7. New Jersey: Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
8. New York: Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
9. North Carolina: Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966);
Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cer. denied, 287 N.C.
464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
10. Pennsylvania: Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); Marko v. Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966).
11. Tennessee: Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Hogan v.
McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
12. Virginia: Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
131. But see Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972), in which the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court held that wrongful death had a common law origin and thus the court was
not constricted by the ordinary rules of construction in applying a legislatively granted right. This
case was one of the principal foundations for the Massachusetts court's decision in Mone v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354,331 N.E.2d 916 (1975), which overruled Leccese v. McDonough,
361 Mass. 64, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1972) (requiring live birth), shortly after it was handed down.
132. See, e.g., Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Stidham v. Ashmore,
109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959). See note 124 infra and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
134. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924
(Okla. 1976).
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(4) Live birth is an arbitrary point from which to measure life or
personhood.1
35
(5) The wrongful death statute is punitive in nature, and there is
just as much reason to punish a wrongdoer where the unborn infant
dies before birth as where it survives to live birth. 136
(6) Not to allow recovery would be to permit a wrong without a
remedy. If the fetus is recognized as a life separate from its mother,
certain elements of damage can only be compensated in an action by
the unborn child.
137
(7) Allowing a wrongful death action is a "reasonable and natu-
ral development" of the rule allowing recovery by infants born alive.13
8
Despite the fact that the current weight of authority is with those
courts which do not require live birth as a condition for maintaining a
wrongful death action-and the balance has recently shifted further in
that direction with the Massachusetts and Oklahoma Supreme Courts'
overruling of prior decisions requiring live birth 139-the courts of a
substantial number of jurisdictions continue to require live birth.
140
These jurisdictions include such important and populous states as Cali-
fornia, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas.'
4 '
The reasons advanced by the courts in these states are generally the
obverse of those of the states having no such requirement. The essen-
tial determination is that the state's wrongful death statute does not
include unborn fetuses within the statutory definition of persons.
While most of these courts acknowledge the separate existence of the
fetus, 14 2 they nevertheless find that the legislature did not intend to in-
dude the fetus as a person for whose death an action may be main-
tained. Drawing on the analogy to property and criminal law, they
point out that the rights of the unborn, which have traditionally been
protected, mature only upon live birth and that those rights are for the
sole benefit of the infant and not for the benefit of those who might
135. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Poliquin v. MacDon-
ald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
136. See, e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354 (1974). This rationale
is applicable only in a few jurisdictions.
137. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); White v.
Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969).
138. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
139. Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Evans v. Olson,
550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976).
140. See note 130 supra.
141. Id
142. As late as 1958, the Tennessee Supreme Court still spoke of the fetus as "apart of its own
mother's physical body." Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 243, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958).
see Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 22, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951).
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take through the child. 143 In support of the logic, justice and consis-
tency of this restrictive interpretation of the wrongful death statutes,
these courts put forth the following arguments:
(1) The considerations of justice that support compensation of
the living infant are absent. There is no deformity to live with, no pe-
cuniary injury, and no pain and suffering. 144
(2) Since there is no pecuniary loss to the infant, the award of
damages is purely punitive, not compensatory. 45
(3) Drawing a line at birth is no more arbitrary than drawing it
anywhere else and perhaps less so than drawing it at the point at which
the fetus becomes "quick" or "viable," since birth is a tangible and
concrete event.
46
(4) The problems concerning proof of causation and of damages
are greatly reduced as is the danger of speculative and fraudulent
claims. 147
(5) The real damages suffered by the parents can be recovered by
them separately. Thus, disallowing the fetus' cause of action reduces
the likelihood of double recovery.'
48
While the differences between the two sides can, to some extent, be
explained by differences in the specific wrongful death statutes in-
volved, the opinions of the courts express more fundamental differ-
ences in philosophy and policy than can be explained either by minor
variations in statutory language or by whether the applicable statute is
a "true" wrongful death statute, under which damages are measured by
the loss to the survivors, or is of a type that measures damages by the
pecuniary loss to the estate or by some other formula amounting to a
combination survival and wrongful death statute. Clearly, a statute
such as was in force in North Carolina at the time of Gay v.
143. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24
N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Carrol v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9
(1964); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
144. See Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d
478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
145. The decisions in several states whose wrongful death statutes limit recovery to pecuniary
loss are based principally on this ground. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140
(1964); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966). Even where the statute is not so
restricted, however, judges have suggested the appropriateness of this limitation. See, e.g., Carroll
v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
146. See Graf v. Taggert, 43 NJ. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d
478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
147. See Graf v. Taggert, 43 NJ. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394,
146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966).
148. See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95,268 P.2d 178 (1954); Marko v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 18.3, at 1031 (1956).
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Thompson, 49 which limited recovery to "pecuniary losses," calls for a
different measure of damages than one in which damages are not so
limited, and if there are no pecuniary losses, then a North Carolina-
type statute would prevent any recovery at all.150 Yet Oklahoma's stat-
ute also was interpreted by its Supreme Court to limit recovery to "pe-
cuniary" losses' and North Carolina and Oklahoma are on opposite
sides of the live-birth question.152 Thus, although the nominal founda-
tion for any cause of action on behalf of an unborn child is necessarily
the applicable wrongful death statute, the differences seem to stem not
from the form or wording of the statute but from different conceptions
of how far the protection of the law should extend-from different con-
ceptions of duty.
Once the courts recognized the fetus as a living entity with a sepa-
rate biological existence, it was clearly tempting to carry the proposi-
tion to its logical extreme-to endow this living being with all the
attributes of personhood and to extend to it all the legal protections
that attach to that concept. Thus, when the death of that separate bio-
logical existence occurred through the wrongful act of another, logic
dictated that such a wrong required a remedy. As stated by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
Denying a right of action for negligence [sic] acts which produce a
stillbirth leads to some very incongruous results. For example, a doc-
tor or a midwife whose negligent acts in delivering a baby produced
the baby's death would be legally immune from a lawsuit. However,
if they badly injured the child they would be exposed to liability.
Such a legal rule would produce the absurd result that an unborn
child who was badly injured by the tortious acts of another, but who
was born alive, could recover while an unborn child, who was more
severely injured and died as the result of the tortious acts of another,
could recover nothing.
5 3
But do logic and congruity require the law to go so far? Even the
courts that recognize a cause of action for the death of the unborn fetus
do not extend the liability backward in time to the point at which bio-
logically a separate existence is first recognized. That point occurs very
149. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
150. In 1973 North Carolina's statute was revised to make it more like the Lord Campbell or
"true" wrongful death statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1976). In a decision applying the
revised statute, the North Carolina Court of Appeals adhered to the view that a viable fetus was
not a "person" within the meaning of the statute. Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213
S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
151. Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 928 (Okla. 1976).
152. See note 130 supra.




early in pregnancy.1 54 Except for Georgia, where the threshold point
for liability is "quickness" of the fetus,'15 and Rhode Island, where the
court held the distinction between viable and nonviable fetuses to be
arbitrary, 15 6 the threshold for liability for wrongful death occurs at "vi-
ability."' 157 But what change occurs at viability that makes it a water-
shed for such a marked alteration in the obligations owed to the fetus?
The answer to this question is not very clear. The one given by the
cases is that at this point the fetus becomes capable of independent life
if separated from its mother. Transition from nonviability to viability,
however, is not marked by some sharp line of demarcation, accompa-
nied by a clearly identified signal to the mother or physician. It is a
hazy, perhaps variable, zone of time estimated to occur between the
middle of the sixth month and the end of the seventh month of preg-
nancy.'l5  Each day of development before birth will increase the odds
of fetal survival, but whether a fetus born near the boundary point be-
tween nonviability and viability will live may be more a function of the
medical facilities available and the skill and attention of the attending
medical team than of the fetus' own strength and maturity. '
9
The nature of wrongful death and survival statutes also casts
doubt on the use of the viability requirement. When a person dies as
the result of the wrongful act of another, two interests are invaded-the
interest of the survivors in the benefits that would flow from his contin-
ued life and the interest of the deceased in his bodily integrity.
160
Wrongful death statutes of the Lord Campbell type redress only the
former interest; survival statutes redress the latter. Some jurisdictions
have survival statutes in lieu of or supplementary to the Lord Campbell
type. 161
A fetus is a biologically separate living being very early in its
mother's pregnancy. 162 Its capacity to sense and respond to external
154. See note 59 supra.
155. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
156. Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976).
157. See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.
158. L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, supra note 9, at 493; K. MOORE, supra note 123, at 83.
159. L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, supra note 9, at 493; Stewart & Reynolds, Improved Prog-
nosis for Infants of Very Low Birthweight in VULNERABLE INFANTS 243 (J. Schwartz & L.
Schwartz eds. 1977).
160. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915). See also 1 S. SPEISER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 66 (2d ed. 1975).
161. See, for example, the wrongful death and survival statutes of the state of Washington for
a comprehensive combination of statutes designed to compensate all losses suffered by both dece-
dent and survivors. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010, 4.20.020, 4.20.046, 4.20.060 and 4.24.010
(1976); see 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 160, at 407-10.
162. See note 59 supra.
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stimuli and experience "fetal distress" are developed as early as the
tenth week. 63 Thus, if the interest which the law seeks to protect is the
bodily integrity of the unborn infant, the need for protection occurs
much earlier than the point of viability. Whether the death of the fetus
occurs before or after viability, the real harm it has suffered is the de-
privation of the potential for life after birth. As to the interest of the
survivors, it seems that they have lost very little that cannot be compen-
sated in an action brought on their behalf. Medical, hospital and fu-
neral expenses-flowing as they do directly from the injury to the
mother-are compensable. The pain and suffering of the mother re-
sulting from the miscarriage-including mental and emotional dis-
tress-are compensable in an action in her own behalf. As stated by
the New York Court of Appeals: "So far as a miscarriage or the
delayed delivery of a stillborn child augments the mother's physical
injury, pain, or suffering, so far is it proper to be considered on the
question of damages. ... 164 The father may recover for the loss of
the services and consortium of his wife. 165 Neither can recover for the
deprivation of offspring, but, as stated by Judge Haynsworth in his dis-
sent in Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co., "juries usually take care of
the situation."1 66 Although this answer is perhaps not jurisprudentially
pure, it expresses the practical answer to the problem of full-but not
multiple-recovery for justifiably compensable damages.
In 1965, David A. Gordon wrote:
The hardship of many of the decisions denying relief lay in the
fact that they required an infant to go through life ... bearing the
seal of another's fault. There is no such justification in the wrongful
death situation .... Although it is true that parents have been able
to recover substantially for the loss of a minor child, the grant of
compensation to the beneficiaries of such a minor, and a fortiori to
the parents of an infant in utero, is in reality compensation for senti-
mental loss framed as though it were pecuniary loss.
A fundamental basis of tort law is the provision of compensation
to an innocent plaintiff for the loss that he has suffered. Tort law is
not, as a general rule, premised upon punishing the wrongdoer. It is
not submitted that the tortious destroyer of a child in utero should be
able to escape completely by killing instead of merely maiming. But
it is submitted that to compensate the parents any further than they
are entitled by well-settled principles of law and to give them a wind-
163. See notes 119, 122 supra and text accompanying notes 122-23 supra.
164. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 488, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 72-73
(1969) (quoting Witrak v. Nassau Elec. R.R., 52 App. Div. 234, 236, 65 N.Y.S.257, 258 (1900))
(emphasis omitted).
165. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d at 487, 248 N.E.2d at 906, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
166. 341 F.2d 75, 81 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
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fall through the estate of the fetus is blatant punishment.
67
Despite the substantial increase in the weight of authority support-
ing the opposite view since 1965, the conclusions reached by Gordon
remain sound. The concept of viability is too elusive and arbitrary to
serve as an appropriate device for limiting the duty owed to the fetus
that is never born alive. The difficulty of proving causation, the danger
that damages to survivors will be purely speculative and, most funda-
mentally, the lack of any meaningful correlation between damages
awarded and the real injury-the loss by the fetus of its potential for
life-all point persuasively toward the need for a rule strictly limiting
the duty of care owed to a fetus that dies before birth.
If these considerations are deemed persuasive in the case of the
death of unborn infants, should they also be used to cut off a cause of
action for an infant dying soon after live birth from prenatal injuries?
Is live birth-with postnatal life lasting perhaps only an instant-such
a watershed that it should be the point from which tort law's protection
of life is measured? For both practical and policy reasons, live birth
should be the limiting principle. Live birth is a tangible, concrete, ob-
servable event, the event from which human life has traditionally been
measured in the common law. Although any line has a degree of arbi-
trariness, drawing the line at live birth would seem more in accord with
the objectives of a just compensation system than a line drawn at any
other point. The practical difficulties accompanying any earlier thresh-
old are substantially reduced. Any later threshold would be even more
artificial and arbitrary.168 In addition, considerations of humanity and
compassion point to the same conclusion. Again, to quote Judge Hayn-
sworth in Todd:
The longer the pregnancy, the greater the parent's expectation
and the deeper the sense of loss if there is a miscarriage or the child is
stillborn. The potential personal loss the parents may suffer does not
spring from nothingness the moment the child becomes viable. It is a
progressive thing. The progress is unmarked by the attainment of
viability, but it is tremendously enlarged when the child born alive is
seen and embraced by its mother and, perhaps, by its father. In some
circumstances, the loss of a month-old fetus may be a crushing disap-
pointment to the prospective parents, but the loss of a child born
alive and loved, even for a little while, is a cause of much greater
167. Gordon, supra note 9, at 594-95 (footnotes omitted).
168. It is noted, however, that the English Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, c.
28, § 4(4), provides that no damages shall be recoverable for wrongful death unless the child lives
at least 48 hours. A commentator has suggested that this dividing line is "probably justified on the
basis that the first 48 hours are usually the most crucial and thereafter chances of survival increase
considerably . Hoggett, The Unborn Child and the Law of Tort-I, 120 SOLICITERS' J. 807
(1976).
1430 [Vol. 1978:1401
Vol. 1978:1401] INJURY TO THE UNBORN
grief.1 69
When Gordon published his paper over a decade ago, he ended
the wrongful death section with an expression of hope that future
courts would ignore Verkennes v. Corniea,70 the earliest reported case
granting an action for the death of a viable fetus.' 7 1 Unfortunately, the
trend of judicial decision has been in the opposite direction.172 But the
trend may not be irreversible. In 1977, in a case of first impression for
it, the California Supreme Court aligned California in the camp of the
live-birth minority.'73 And, after all, for more than a half-century after
Dietrich, the decisions were virtually uniform in not allowing an action
at all for injuries to the unborn.
One reason for the wrong direction of the current trend is an over-
weening demand by the courts for apparent consistency and symmetry.
That demand is illustrated by the oft-quoted hypothetical regarding
twins in which the question is postulated: If a born-alive child suffers
damages from prenatal injury, why shouldn't its twin which dies prior
to birth from similar injuries also be compensated? 74 If a fetus is capa-
ble of living outside the womb, is it not just as much a "person" as a
child who lives only a day, an hour or a minute after birth? If it is a
169. 341 F.2d at 80-81 (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
170. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
171. Gordon, supra note 9, at 595. See also Comment, Developments in the Law of Prenatal
Wrongful Death, 69 DICK. L. REv. 258 (1965).
172. The Restatement Second position is consistent with that trend, but the Reporter's "Note
to Institute" and comments accompanying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979) waffle
on the issue of live birth. Section 869 states:
§ 869. Harm to Unborn Child.
(1) One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the
child for the harm if it is born alive.
(2) If the child is not born alive, there is no liability unless the applicable wrongful
death statute so provides.
Reporter's Note 2 states:
2. Must the child be born alive?
Essentially it appears to come down to the construction of the language of the
wrongful death act in the particular state-is the child the sort of "person" intended to
be included? The drafting group and the Council have agreed that this is something that
the Restatement cannot determine. The Reporter and the Advisers are inclined to say
that there can be no cause of action until the child is born alive. Until then it is a part of
the mother. If the injury causes the stillbirth, she should have damages of her own. If it
does not, no one should recover. There is too much danger of duplication of the
mother's damages in such a case. For this reason the Advisers have proposed the nega-
tive form of statement in Subsection (2). An alternative, of course, is to state that there is
liability if, but only if, the statute is construed so to provide.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869, Comment on Subsection (2) at 177-78 (Tent. Draft
No. 16, 1970).
173. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
174. See Stidham v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431,434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959), where the
hypothetical apparently was first proposed. The anomaly resulting from the live-birth rule is that
the more severely injured does not recover while the less severely injured does.
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"person" in that sense, why is it not a "person" in the sense of one to
whom a duty of care exists, who can suffer present damages and can
have standing to bring an action for compensation for those damages?
If one demands total consistency and complete symmetry, then the
answer is foreordained. But such total consistency and symmetry are
not demanded by our doctrine of stare decisis or by any other principle
of our system of jurisprudence. In Roe v. Wade,'75 the United States
Supreme Court determined that unborn fetuses-regardless of their
stage of development-were not persons entitled to the protections of
the fourteenth amendment. An unborn infant's rights were recognized
in the law of property and criminal law only if the child were later born
alive. The practical considerations discussed earlier-much greater
difficulties of proof, the possibility of multiple damages for the same
injury, the possibility of speculative awards-all seem to point toward a
live-birth requirement. If, however, we founder because we cannot
conceptualize a framework upon which to base a requirement for live
birth, perhaps one can be found in Holmes' opinion in Dietrich. De-
spite the infirmities we see in that opinion in the light of today's medi-
cal and biological knowledge, it contained-almost as
afterthought-the germ of a theory that, if one could meet Holmes'
other objections to recovery, "a man might owe a civil duty and incur a
conditionalprospective liability in tort to one not yet in being."'
' 1 6
The concept has been embraced in a number of other cases.177 It
was most clearly articulated by an Australian court in Watt v. Rama.'
7 8
Since the case was one of first impression in Australia, the court, as
stated by Chief Justice Winneke and Justice Pape resorted
to basal principles involved in the tort of negligence .... The foun-
dation is the duty to take care, and whether such a duty exists de-
pends upon a relationship existing, or coming into existence, between
the parties which is capable in the particular circumstances of the
case of imposing a duty on the one in relation to the other.1
79
After finding that this relationship depended on the familiar principle
of the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and that
the reasonable foreseeability of harm not only gives rise to the duty
"but also provides the test for determining whether a person injured by
175. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1972).
176. 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884) (emphasis added).
177. E.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cerl. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1964); Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Park v. Ches-
sin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modifled, 60 App. Div.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1977), rev'd in part sub non. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
178. [1972] Vict. 353 (Sup. Ct. Vict. Austl. 1971).
179. Id at 359.
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the careless conduct of another falls within the class of persons to
whom a duty of care is owed,"' ° the justices developed their rationale
as follows:
In the common case where the act or neglect of the defendant and the
injury to the plaintiff are for all practical purposes contemporaneous,
the duty attaches to the defendant and is breached when the act or
neglect occurs. But where the injury does not occur contemporane-
ously with the act or neglect, the relationship will not necessarily
crystallize so as to create a duty at the time of the act or neglect.
Where the injury to the plaintiff occurs only subsequently to the time
of the act or neglect in circumstances where the plaintiff is not de-
fined at that time, as for example where he is only one of a class, the
relationship and the duty to arise therefrom may be said to be contin-
gent or potential but capable of ripening into a relationship imposing
a duty when the plaintiff becomes defined.' 8 '
Applying this idea of a potential or noncrystallized duty to the sit-
uation in Watt, in which a pregnant woman was injured through the
negligence of the defendant, the justices concluded:
In such a case [the defendant] would be bound to take the woman as
he found her,. . . and her pregnancy would be just as much a physi-
cal condition in his victim as would be the case of a person having an
eggshell skull. If it might reasonably have been foreseen that the
pregnant woman might be injured by his carelessness, it must follow
that the possibility of injury on birth to the child she was carrying
must equally be taken to have been reasonably foreseeable ....
Those circumstances, accordingly, constituted a potential relation-
ship capable of imposing a duty on the defendant in relation to the
child if and when born. On the birth the relationship crystallized
and out of it arose a duty on the defendant in relation to the child.'8 2
To dispel any idea that the duty to the infant was derived from a duty
to the pregnant mother, the justices added: "But as the child could not
in the very nature of things acquire rights correlative to a duty until it
became by birth a living person,. . . it was, we think, at that stage that
the duty arising out of the relationship was attached to the defend-
ant." 183
While the introduction of the artificiality of a duty created on birth
and relating back to the time of the act constituting the breach may not
add to the persuasiveness of the analysis, the idea of a contingent or
noncrystallized duty is helpful indeed. Certainly it is foreseeable to the
reasonable person that an act which endangers a pregnant woman also
endangers the fetus she is carrying. An actor has no duty to that fetus
180. Id





not because it is not within the reasonably foreseeable radius of danger
but because it is not yet a person to whom the law's protection ex-
tends-it has only the potentiality of becoming one. Thus, the law
says, one acts toward it at one's peril. If that fetus then becomes, by
birth, a person to whom the law's protection does extend, then the actor
is liable for any injury he may have caused. The duty relates back not
in the sense that it springs full-blown out of nothingness, but rather that
it matures from a previously existing but incomplete or inchoate duty.
Analysis along the foregoing lines provides a sound basis for limit-
ing recoveries to infants who are born alive. 84 It may also be a way of
reconciling several novel fact situations with traditional notions of neg-
ligence liability.
85
III. THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE
When Gordon wrote in 1965 that "[t]he battle in jurisprudence is
almost over,"' 8 6 he was referring to the twenty-year struggle to obtain
recognition of the unborn plaintiff's right of action for negligently in-
flicted prenatal injuries and to establish the appropriate criteria for and
limitations on such actions. One wonders whether he would have been
so bold as to make that statement if he could have foreseen the novelty
and variety of claims that would be made on behalf of infants and their
parents in the ensuing dozen or so years. These have included claims
by infants for illegitimate birth,' 87 for birth to a mentally retarded
mother, 8 8 for birth in a diseased or disabled condition, 8 9 for postnatal
damages flowing from preconception injury to the mother, 90 for claims
by parents for the birth of children, both normal and abnormal, after
184. Adopting the contingent-duty approach is one way of reconciling the tort cases allowing
recovery to infants for prenatal injury with the abortion cases that permit the subordination of the
interest in potential life to the mother's right of privacy. Since the duty is contingent on birth, an
abortion is not the intentional destruction of a "person." On the other hand, if the approach
permitting a wrongful death action by a fetus not born alive is adopted, then we must conclude
either that the mother (and her abortionist) become liable for the death of the fetus when she
exercises her constitutional right of privacy or that the Supreme Court has created a privilege in
the mother immunizing her from potential criminal or tort liability. By considering the duty owed
to the fetus to be contingent, one avoids these constitutional issues. See text accompanying notes
182-83 supra.
185. The contingent-duty concept is particularly helpful in the preconception-injury cases.
See text accompanying notes 194-210 infra.
186. Gordon, supra note 9, at 627.
187. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
188. Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
189. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), rev'd inpart sub noan.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
190. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
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unsuccessful sterilizations 91 and for denial of the opportunity to abort
a presumptively defective fetus.'
92
Of these claims, the one most akin to the cases already addressed is
the claim for postnatal damage to the infant arising from preconception
injury to the mother. The other categories-which collectively have
been called "wrongful birth" or "wrongful life" actions193-present
more novel and difficult jurisprudential issues and will be considered in
the final section of this Article.
A. Postnatal Damage from Preconception Wrongs.
Although a number of hypothetical situations can be visualized in
which a child could suffer damage from wrongful acts of another prior
to its conception, ' 94 there appear to be only three reported appellate
cases in which this issue was raised.
In Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc.,195 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying its interpreta-
tion of Oklahoma law, held that an allegation that birth control pills
manufactured by the defendant caused chromosomal changes in a
mother resulting in her giving birth to mongoloid twins stated a cause
of action for the twins for retardation, deformity, and pain and suffer-
ing during their lifetimes. The Illinois Supreme Court held in Renslow
v. Mennonite Hospital'96 that an allegation that the negligent transfus-
ing of a thirteen-year-old Rh-negative female with Rh-positive blood
resulting in permanent disability to a child born to her nine years later
stated a cause of action on behalf of the child. In Bergstreser v.
Mitchell,197 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, under Mis-
souri law, a cause of action was stated on behalf of an infant who suf-
fered harmful hypoxia or anoxia during an emergency premature
191. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
192. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
193. Some courts have made a distinction between "wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" cases,
classifying within the former term only those actions brought by the infant itself and within the
latter category actions brought by parents to recover damages suffered by them. See, e.g., Sher-
lock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 172 n.4 (Minn. 1977). Some have distinguished "wrong-
ful conception" cases from either category. E.g., id at 174-75. This Article will use the terms
"wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" synonymously to include actions by both the infant and its
parents. For a subcategorization, see text accompanying notes 213-15 infra.
194. These could include birth deformities resulting from genetic changes induced by exces-
sive X-ray exposure of the mother and abnormalities resulting from either parent's prior use of
drugs. More prosaic are those injuries which an infant might receive from mechanical sources
(e.g., toys, machines, foods and medicines) which were manufactured prior to the child's concep-
tion but used or consumed by the child after birth.
195. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
196. 67 I11. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
197. 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Caesarian section caused by the defendant physicians' and hospital's
negligence in performing a prior Caesarian section on the mother.
The most interesting of these cases, from the viewpoints both of
the factual context and the depth and scope of the opinions, is Renslow.
The objection to establishing liability in that case-as in Jorgensen and
Bergstreser-was that there could be no duty owed to a person not in
being at the time of a defendant's claimed negligence. 198 The plurality
opinion of Justice Moran met this objection by adopting an approach
similar to Holmes' concept of a conditional prospective liability. t99
While the opinion does not make clear whether it lelies on a "trans-
ferred negligence" growing out of a duty to the child's mother"' 0 or on
an independent duty to the potential child herself growing out of the
foreseeability of the harm to the child,20' its discussion of both of these
alternatives and the discussion in the concurring opinion of Justice
Dooley indicate that the court's holding is solidly grounded on the con-
cept of duty-a duty whose outer perimeter is established by the con-
cept of foreseeability. Recognizing that use of the foreseeability factor
alone as the measure of duty might lead to the possibility of liability in
perpetuity-as, for example, claims of second- or third-generation de-
scendants for genetic damage from radiation or chemical exposure of
their ancestors-the majority relied on the judiciary to "exercise its
traditional role of drawing rational distinctions, consonant with current
perceptions ofjustice, between harms which are compensable and those
which are not."20
If Renslow is to be faulted, it is for failing to state any guidelines as
to the proper cut-off point for the duty owed to children not yet con-
ceived, as it may be tested at the margin in future cases. The opinions
have given us the outer perimeter-the limits of reasonable foreseeabil-
ity-and stated that other policy considerations will limit the duty at
some point inside that outer perimeter. How are we to find that point?
198. In addition, whether the statute of limitations should bar the cause of action was at issue
in Renslow. 67 Ill. 2d at 349-50, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
199. See id at 350-51, 367 N.E.2d at 1251-52 (discussing Justice Holmes' opinion in Dietrich).
200. Id at 355-57, 367 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
201. Id
202. Id at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. Seizing on the possibility of just such remote and attenu-
ated claims, Justice Ryan, in the principal dissenting opinion, accused the majority of having
"abandoned the traditional fault concept of liability premised upon duty and foreseeability and
embraced instead a system which depends wholly upon the element of causation." Id at 372, 367
N.E.2d at 1262. Justice Ryan's opinion is seriously flawed, however, by his use of the case princi-
pally as a vehicle for an argument against the abandonment of the fault concept in tort in favor of
recovery based solely on the principles "Let All Accident Victims Be Compensated" and "Let The
Loss Be Spread," id at 373, 367 N.E.2d at 1262, principles not applied, nor even suggested, in
either of the opinions supported by the majority.
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Some more helpful guideline is needed than simply a consonance with
"current perceptions of justice. ' 20 3
But the Renslow court is not alone in finding difficulty in articulat-
ing helpful and concrete criteria for determining the limits of duty. It
would be hard to find a court in the land which has not at one time
struggled to find an all-purpose formula to guide its decisions. Numer-
ous commentators in dozens of scholarly articles have labored, and
continue to labor, in an attempt to bring order out of the disorder that
seems to exist in the writing on duty and the related concept of proxi-
mate cause. All attempts have been unsuccessful. The definitions end
up being circular, saying essentially that duty is a relation between in-
dividuals without which there could be no liability. 20 4 Prosser eventu-
ally gave up trying to provide a formula, stating: "No better general
statement can be made, than that the courts will find a duty where, in
general, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists.' 2 °s
Dean Leon Green approached the problem from a different per-
spective but came to essentially the same conclusion. Eschewing fore-
sight as the sole criterion he stated that it was the hindsight of the
"wisest of our profession, the judges, '20 6 viewing the transaction in its
complete environmental setting, and calling into play "far-flung con-
siderations affecting the welfare of persons not parties to the litiga-
tion,' 2 7 that must tell us whether a duty exists in a particular
transaction: "It is impossible to write a meaningful formula that will
give a judge's hindsight anything approaching automatic precision.
2 8
The Renslow court might have spelled out the "far-flung considera-
tions" with which it would distinguish those harms which are compen-
sable from those which are not. But perhaps adhering to Dean Green's
admonition that duty can only be set with hindsight, with a view of the
transaction in its complete environmental setting, was the wiser course.
Viewing Renslow in this context, it seems apparent that the duty
issue was properly resolved in that case. The medical facts creating a
risk of harm to this prospective plaintiff were well understood at the
time of the transfusion-so well understood that a medical text quoted
in the plurality opinion and predating the transfusion stated: "[I]t must
be an absolute rule that Rh-positive blood is never transfused to an Rh-
203. Id at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
204. W. PROSSER, supra note 118, at 325.
205. Id 327.
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negative female who is below the age of menopause. ' 20 9 The plaintiff's
mother clearly fell within the operation of this rule. The injury suffered
by the plaintiff was not remote enough to create difficulties of proof,
and the injury was tangible and compensable under the traditional tort
measure of recovery-the comparison of the condition of the plaintiff
given the injury and his condition if the injury had not occurred.21 0
Conceptually, once one accepts the proposition that a fetus- even
a viable one-is not fully a legal person and only becomes one upon
live birth, then the Renslow decision does not present a significant ex-
tension of the principles of liability for prenatal injuries. The interest
protected in such cases is thepotentiality of human life in a healthy and
whole condition. The duty of care imposed on other persons is im-
posed to protect that interest and no other. If a living infant suffers
pain or disability from the wrongful act of another, liability should not
depend on whether the wrongful act occurred during life, during prena-
tal life or prior to conception. That the duty of care, the breach of
which will create liability, should not depend on the physical existence
of the individual plaintiff at the moment of the defendant's wrongful
act is most aptly illustrated by the frequently used hypothetical exam-
ple of defective baby food manufactured before the child who con-
sumed it was born. If recovery depended on the baby being alive at the
time of manufacture, then such a child would be without a remedy.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing discussion, .Renslow seems
only a modest extension of the duty of care to the unborn. But, obvi-
ously, Renslow could spawn tougher cases. Some of the more difficult
will probably be claims for genetic damage or mutations in the second
or third generation from radiation or chemical exposure. Difficulties in
these cases would stem not only from the remoteness of the claimed
damages but also from the difficulties of proof of causation, which in
such cases is principally statistical in nature.2" Perhaps by the time
such cases arise, the state of our medical and scientific knowledge will
209. P. MOLLISON, BLOOD TRANSFUSION IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 418 (1961), quoted in
Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 353-54, 357 N.E.2d at 1253.
210. As pointed out in Comment, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived, 48 U.
COLO. L. REV. 621, 626 (1977), the Renslow decision is also consistent with the enterprise liability
theory in that the costs of injuries are borne by all those who receive transfusions rather than by
an individual recipient who may be injured.
211. Comment, Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law,
28 Sw. L.J. 414, 423 (1974). The English Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, c. 28,
§§ 1(3), 4(5), meets the problem by providing that only the first generation is entitled to sue. See
Hoggett, supra note 168; Pace, Civi/Liabihtyfor Pre-NatalInjuries, 40 MoD. L. REv. 141, 149 n.38
(1977). A proposal for American legislation similarly restricting liability for remote harm is made
in Comment, Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaint7r Is There a Limit? 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217
(1978).
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have advanced to the point that judges can, with greater confidence
than today, draw sensible outer boundaries of duty.
Some situations may pose policy problems which are even more
difficult to resolve than those of remoteness and of staleness. Although
some may be capable of resolution by application of the duty formula,
others may not be. Injuries to an infant from the wrongful act or ne-
glect of its parents- either before or during pregnancy-pose unusu-
ally difficult issues. Infecting a child with venereal disease, inflicting it
with a deformity or disability resulting from chromosomal changes
brought about by the mother's preconception drug use, causing physi-
cal or mental illness of the child through the mother's neglect of proper
nutrition and health care during pregnancy, using alcohol and tobacco
to excess during pregnancy, or giving birth to a baby when the parents
have a known genetic defect that likely will appear in the child all seem
to be cases which are ripe for litigation. Since it would normally be the
parent who would bring an action on behalf of a child in such a case, it
is not surprising that no such cases have been reported. But resorting
to the duty concept will not resolve them when they do appear. The
duty would seem clear in such cases. Yet other policy considerations,
such as intrafamily immunity and the parents' independent rights of
privacy and bodily integrity, may lead to a denial of a cause of action
to the infant. This subject has been explored elsewhere 12 and will be
touched on herein only as it may be raised by the wrongful life cases.
B. Wrongful Life.
The terms "wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" seem to have been
used first in Zepeda v. Zepeda.213 Although courts and commentators
have applied the terms to a wide variety of actions brought by parents
or by infants for damages growing out of unexpected or unwanted
birth, or out of birth under conditions of disability or disadvantage, it is
helpful for purposes of analysis to break these cases down into three
categories.
The first includes cases in which an act of sexual intercourse pro-
ducing conception, which creates life, also inflicts an injury on the child
when born (as by genetic disease). The wrongful act can be either that
of the parent or parents in having intercourse under the circumstances
or of a third party who had the duty to prevent intercourse or concep-
212. See SUFFOLK L. Rev. Note, supra note 22. The student author of that Note applies a
balancing process to the interests of the mother and the in utero fetus and concludes that gross
negligence should "be the point at which the woman's right to the free control of her body should
be subordinate to the unborn child's right to begin life with a sound mind and body." Id 609.
213. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
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tion. Falling within this category are cases such as Zepeda, in which an
infant sought recovery for being born an "adulterine bastard," and Wil-
liams v. State,21 4 in which the infant sought recovery for being born an
illegitimate child to a feeble-minded mother. The second category in-
cludes cases in which the negligence charged results in conception of an
unwanted child. The paradigm case in this category is the ineffective
sterilization of a parent resulting in the birth of an unplanned but
healthy child, for which the parents seek compensation for the expenses
of raising the child to adulthood. Although there may be some overlap
between this category and the first category, particularly in cases in
which the reason for the sterilization or contraception was to prevent
the passing along of a genetic defect, they will be treated separately in
the discussion below. The third category includes those cases in which,
through the negligent act of the defendant, an injured or defective fetus
is allowed to continue to term. The paradigm case in this category is
the negligent failure to diagnose a pregnant mother's rubella, the result
of which is the birth of a deformed or disabled child because of the
forfeited opportunity to obtain an abortion. For convenience these
three categories will be labeled wrongful-conception cases, failed-
contraception cases and abortion-denied cases.2"'
1. Wrongful-Conception Cases. The first American case in
which the issue of "wrongful life" was presented to an appellate court
was Zepeda. In that case, the infant-plaintiff sued his father for dam-
ages because he had been born an adulterine bastard; his father had
induced his mother to have sexual intercourse by promising to marry
her when in fact the father was already married. The damages sought
were for deprivation of the right to be a legitimate child, to have a
normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his father and from
his paternal ancestors, and for being stigmatized as a bastard. The trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.21 6
In an opinion which frankly acknowledged the father's action as a
"tort," the Appellate Court of Illinois nevertheless affirmed dismissal of
the complaint
because of our belief that lawmaking, while inherent in the judicial
process, should not be indulged in where the result could be as
sweeping as here. The interest of society is so involved, the action
needed to redress the tort could be so 'far-reaching, that the policy of
214. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
215. A somewhat similar categorization is suggested in Kashi, The Case ofthe Uniwanted Bless-
ing: WrongfulLfe, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1409 (1977).
216. 41 111. App. 2d at 245, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
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the State should be declared by the representatives of the people.
2 17
The "sweeping" result referred to by the court was not so much the
opening of the doors of the courts to other illegitimates-although their
sheer numbers would have been enormous 2 'S-as it was the "nature of
the new action and the related suits which would be encouraged.
2 19
Encouragement would extend to all others born into the world under
conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages
for being of a certain color, another because of race; one for being
born with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate
family characteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute
family, another because a parent has an unsavory reputation.220
Although the principal thrust of the opinion was directed to the
danger of spawning a host of similar actions if relief were granted and
the necessity that legislative action should authorize such a step, the
court recognized the baffling jurisprudential dilemma that permeated
the sought-for action-the fact that the "defendant's wrongful act si-
multaneously procreated the being whom it injured."221 Or, as stated
elsewhere in the opinion: "[Tihe quintessence of his complaint is that
he was born and that he is. Herein lies the intrinsic difficulty of this
case."
222
The second case to reach an appellate-level court was Williams v.
State.223 That case presented the New York Court of Appeals with the
same issue but in a different context. In Williams the defendant was
the State of New York, whose alleged negligent supervision of a state
mental institution allowed a female patient, the plaintiffs mother, to be
raped by another patient, resulting in the plaintiffs birth to a mentally
defective mother. The New York Court of Appeals, like the Appellate
Court of Illinois, held that the common law did not recognize as action-
able the act of causing one to bear the "shame and sorrow" of illegiti-
mate birth. Judge Keating, in his concurring opinion, expressed the
dilemma posed by this type of case most succinctly:
The measure of damage which she is really seeking is based
217. Id at 262-63, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
218. The court pointed out that in 1961, of the nearly 88,000 live births in Cook County, over
11,000 were illegitimate and that the ratio between illegitimate and legitimate births was increas-
ing. Id at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858. Since the time of the Zepeda decision, the proportion of
illegitimate births to total live births has continued to rise, particularly among white women. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 58 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PERSPECTIVES ON AMERI-
CAN FERTILITY 39-48 (1978).
219. 41 111. App. 2d at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
220. Id
221. Id at 253, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
222. Id at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
223. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
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upon a comparison of the position she finds herself now and the posi-
tion she would have been in, had she been born legitimately. Quite
obviously, that is an unwarranted comparison here, for, had the State
acted responsibly, she would not have been born legitimately-she
would not have been born.
2 2 4
Judge Keating's statement reflects the ordinary rule for computing
tort damages-the amount of money necessary to place the plaintiff in
the position she would have occupied but for the injury.225 Thus, if the
plaintiff would not have "been" in the absence of the injury, how can
such a computation be made?
226
The most significant recent challenge to the foregoing holdings oc-
curred in Park v. Chessin.2 7 In that case, the parents of a child born
with a fatal, hereditary kidney disease that resulted in her death two
and one-half years later brought a medical malpractice action against
their physician for their medical and support expenses, their mental
anguish & e.d., and loss of the wife's services, and a "wrongful life"
action on behalf of the child for her pain and suffering during her life.
The wrongful act of the physician which formed the basis of the action
was negligently advising the parents, after the birth of an earlier child
suffering from the same disease, that the chances of a subsequent baby
being similarly diseased were "practically nil."228 The Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to
dismiss the action except for counts for mental anguish and emotional
distress.229 The New York Court of Appeals reversed as to the wrong-
ful life count on behalf of the infant.2 30
The case is significantly different from the prenatal and preconcep-
tion injury cases previously considered in that no specific act of the
defendant was the physical cause of the injury to either the parents or
the child. Rather, the injury flowed from a genetic condition of the
parents themselves. The wrongful act of the defendant was allowing
conception to take place. The underlying assumption of the complaint
is that but for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff-parents would
have prevented conception and the resultant injury to themselves and
to the infant. The wrongful act of the defendant is thus essentially sim-
224. Id at 485, 223 N.E.2d at 345, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
225. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973).
226. Cases in accord with Williams are Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. 1967) and
Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
227. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d I10 (1977), rev'd in part sub nor. Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
228. 60 App. Div. 2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
229. Id at 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
230. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
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ilar to those of the defendants in Zepeda and Williams: negligently23'
allowing conception to take place under circumstances in which the act
of conception which creates life also causes the injury.
The duty of the physician to the parents under the circumstances
of the Park case presented no novel question of tort law:
[V]alidating the parents' cause of action in the instant case merely
extends to a physician a preexisting duty widely recognized in
numerous fields of classic tort law, that one may not speak without
prudence or due care when one had a duty to speak, knows that the
other party intends to rely on what is imparted, and does, in fact, so
rely to his detriment.
232
As to the "wrongful life" cause of action on behalf of the infant,
the essential difference between Park, Zepeda and Williams is in the
injuries suffered. Rather than the intangible disadvantages flowing
from illegitimacy or from birth to a feeble-minded mother, Lara Park
suffered painful physical disease from which she later died. The Ap-
pellate Division found this distinction to be sufficient to support recov-
ery by the infant. In the court's view, a persuasive factor was the
abolition of the statutory ban on abortion, indicating to the court the
emergence of a public policy giving potential parents the right not to
have a child and considerable freedom in the manner in which they
exercised that right. This right, in the view of the majority, extended to
instances in which "it can be determined with medical certainty that
the child would be born deformed. 2 33 The breach of the right was
"tortious to the fundamental right [of the child] to be born as a whole,
functional human being."234 The recovery would be measured by the
infant's "injuries and conscious pain and suffering '"23 -in other words,
on the conventional basis of compensating for the difference between a
"normal" life and one marred by the pain and suffering experienced by
Lara Park.
There are two difficulties with the Appellate Division's analysis.
The first is the unexplained gap in the logical progression from the
right of the parents "not to have a child" to the conclusion that "breach
of this right [of the parents] may also be said to be tortious to the fun-
231. Although the defendant's act in Zepeda was an intentional one, since an intentional act
can be considered more culpable than a negligent one and since relief was nonetheless denied in
Zepeda, the analogy to Zepeda remains appropriate.
232. 60 App. Div. 2d at 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113. The Court of Appeals echoed: "Certainly,
assuming the validity of plaintiffs' allegations, it can be said in traditional tort language that but
for the defendants' breach of their duty to advise plaintiffs, the latter would not have been re-
quired to assume these obligations." 46 N.Y.2d at 412-13.
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damental right [of the child] to be born a whole, functional human be-
ing." The second is the court's failure to consider the fact that, for the
measurement of damages, the benchmark of a pain-free life was not
one within the reach of Lara Park. There was nothing the defendant
could have done that would have given Lara a pain- and disease-free
life, for the cause of the pain and suffering was the genetic defects of
her parents. All the defendant could provide as an alternative was "no
life."
The Court of Appeals found each of these difficulties to be flaws in
the infant's wrongful life claim. The first was characterized as the
"more fundamental." '236 As to it the Court found "no predicate at com-
mon law or in statutory enactment for judicial recognition of the birth
of a defective child as an injury to the child ... ."I' In other words,
there is no fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human
being. The second was that a cause of action on behalf of an infant
demanded a calculation of damages dependent on a comparison of life
in an unimpaired state with lack of existence-a "comparison the law is
not equipped to make." '238
Several student commentators, writing prior to the New York
Court of Appeals' decision in Park and focusing their analyses princi-
pally on the elements of duty and causation, seem to agree with the
Appellate Division's conclusions, thus essentially equating the Park-
type of factual situation with that of Renslow.23 9 These analyses ignore
an essential difference between the two situations. That difference lies
in the opposite consequences which will flow from negligent versus
nonnegligent conduct by the defendant. In Renslow, nonnegligent con-
duct would have resulted (all other factors being equal) in the birth of a
healthy child. In Park, on the other hand, nonnegligent conduct would
have resulted in no birth at all. In assessing compensable harm in
Renslow, therefore, a conventional measure of damages can be ap-
plied-that is, the monetary amount necessary to compensate the
plaintiff for the difference between a whole life and one flawed by the
injury. In Park, the damage assessor faces the impossible task of com-
paring nonlife with life of less than full quality. Other commentators
236. 46 N.Y.2d at 411.
237. Id
238. Id at 412.
239. Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization: Causes ofAction for Parent and Child, 12 J.
FuA. L. 635, 644 (1973) (written prior to Renslow and Park); Note, Torts Prior to Conception: 4
New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REV. 706, 717 (1977). But see Note, Torts-An 4ctionfor
Wrongful Life Brought on Behalf of the Wrongfully Conceived Infant, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
712, 723-25 (1977) (suggested application of the conditional-prospective-liability concept to the
Park situation).
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have tried to develop formulas to measure life with or without defects
against nonlife,2 40 but their efforts are unpersuasive for the reason well
stated by Justice Jasen:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been
born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be
left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can as-
sert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the
very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has [sic]
placed on human life, rather than its absence.24 1
Justice Weintraub, dissenting in part in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
242
perhaps put it best when he said:
Ultimately, the infant's complaint is that he would be better off not to
have been born. Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness,
cannot possibly know whether that is so. . . .To recognize a right
not to be born is to enter an area in which no one can find his way.
2 4 3
2. Failed-Contraception Cases. The dilemma presented by Jus-
tices Jasen and Weintraub is posed most starkly in the failed-contra-
ception cases. In these cases the parents have made an affirmative
decision not to have children-either temporarily or perma-
nently-and have acted on that decision either by the use of contracep-
tives or by having one of the parents sterilized. The paradigm case in
this area is the failure of the contraceptive device or the sterilization
procedure, leading to the birth of a healthy, legitimate child. The usual
damage claim brought by the parents in such cases has included some
or all of the following elements: the cost of the failed sterilization oper-
ation; the medical costs of pregnancy and delivery; the pain and suffer-
ing of the mother during pregnancy and delivery; the costs of rearing
the unwanted child to adulthood; the emotional and psychic costs of an
unwanted pregnancy and rearing an additional child; and the father's
loss of consortium. 2'
Since 1934, when Christensen v. Thornb 45 was decided, the courts
have recognized that there is no public policy against sterilization to
240. See, e.g., Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Lfe," 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966);
Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Lfe" [,4 Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. REv. 58, 66
(1966).
241. 46 N.Y.2d at 411.
242. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
243. Id at 63, 227 A.2d at 711 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
244. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Coleman v.
Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), af'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Bushman v. Burns
Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.
240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
245. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
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protect the wife's health. With Griswold v. Connecticut24 6 and Roe v.
Wade,247 the right of a person to prevent conception and to terminate
pregnancy under certain conditions took on a constitutional dimension.
The recognition of the right not to bear children, however, did not au-
tomatically provide the solution to the problem created when the negli-
gence of a medical practitioner prevented the attempted exercise of that
right from being effective.
Suppose, for example, that a married couple, after the birth by
Caesarian section of several children, decided that for the preservation
of the health of the mother, the husband should obtain a vasectomy. If
the vasectomy is negligently done," resulting in the wife becoming
pregnant and giving birth to a normal, healthy child without adverse
effect upon the health of the mother other than the normal discomfort,
inconvenience and pain of pregnancy and birth by Caesarean section,
and the child born is loved and cherished, should the parents be able to
recover from the physician who performed the vasectomy for malprac-
tice?
Under ordinary tort principles applicable to medical malpractice,
the elements of duty, breach of duty and causation are met. The diffi-
culty is in determining whether an injury has been suffered. If the sole
purpose of the sterilization is to protect the prospective mother's health,
the only injury she has suffered has been the temporary pain and dis-
comfort of pregnancy and delivery-and perhaps the emotional strain
and mental apprehension during pregnancy of the possible adverse ef-
fects upon her health. The husband has suffered the temporary loss of
consortium. Jointly they have acquired the expenses of rearing the
child to adulthood.
But these adverse effects may be offset by the joy, affection, com-
panionship and services of the child during the lifetime of the parents.
Under the tort "benefit rule," 49 these benefits conferred by the defend-
246. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
247. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
248. Not all so-called "failed" vasectomies are the result of negligence. Following a vasec-
tomy, which consists of severing the vas deferens (the tube which carries the male sperm from the
testicles to the urethra), some sperm remain stored in the seminal vesicle and prostate for several
weeks. Thus, if the male resumes intercourse without the use of other contraceptive measures
before a semen analysis indicates the absence of sperm, he may impregnate his mate. Further,
spontaneous recanalization-a growing together of the severed vas- occurs in 0.5% to 1% of
vasectomies. See Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 25, 33 (1975). Negligence by the
physician, consequently, could take place not only in the conduct of the operation but also in the
conduct of the post-operative semen analysis or in failing to counsel the patient about the possibil-
ity of continuing fertility for a period after the operation.
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property
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ant's tortious conduct should be considered in mitigation of damages if
they are to the same interest which was harmed. If the net value of the
benefits conferred is more than the harm inflicted, then there should be
no recovery whatever. Two early cases, adopting the view that the joys
of parenthood always outweigh its burdens, held as a matter of law that
there could be no recovery.25° In one recent case,25' the Michigan
Court of Appeals agreed that the benefits of parenthood could be offset
against all elements of claimed damage, but left it to the jury to decide
the amounts. Some of the more recent cases, however, have divided the
damages into two categories-the first including the pain and suffering
of the mother, the father's loss of consortium, the cost of the failed
sterilization operation and the medical expenses of birth and delivery,
and the second consisting of the expenses of rearing the child to adult-
hood. Only the second category would be subject to offset under the
"benefit rule" since the other interests harmed were not the same as
those benefited.252 Under this rule there would be some "net" injury to
parent-plaintiffs in all cases. Since most courts have been unwilling to
say that in today's society an unplanned child is always a "blessed
event," thus making the benefits outweigh the harm as a matter of law,
they have left it to the fact-finder to perform the balancing act.2
53
The question often raised is how to measure the value of the love,
companionship and services of an unplanned or unwanted infant. Ju-
ries are asked to measure that same value in setting damages in infant
wrongful death actions. Is this measurement any less tangible and diffi-
cult when it is used as an offset against the cost of rearing a child than
when it is an element of damages? Or, for that matter, is it any less
tangible than pain and suffering, consortium or emotional upset? Prob-
ably not, but society has difficulty in casting aside the time-honored
and in doing so has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the
extent this is equitable.
250. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934); Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41, 45-46 (1957). A Delaware trial court reached a similar result on
different grounds. It refused to allow inclusion of the costs of child rearing as an element of
damages, finding that the parents' decision to keep the child after its birth was an implicit determi-
nation that the benefits of having the child outweighed the cost of its rearing. Coleman v. Garri-
son, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); contra Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1977).
251. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 262, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521 (1971).
252. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
253. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1967); Jackson v.
Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 262, 187 N.W.2d
511, 521 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 75, 344 A.2d 336, 339 (1975); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 157, 404
N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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concept that the birth of a child is always a happy occasion. It is true
that in many failed-contraception cases, the unplanned birth may truly
be an unmixed blessing. Presumably this will be the case when the sole
purpose of the sterilization or contraception was to avoid the possibility
of harm to the mother or the possibility of a genetic injury to the child,
and the mother is not harmed and the baby is born healthy. Other
circumstances may make the event less auspicious-the parents may
not be married to each other, the child may be born deformed, the
parents may not have the financial resources to support another family
member254 or the mother may be physically handicapped and unable to
care for the child. Each of these circumstances would make the "net"
cost of rearing the child to maturity quite different. In any of these
situations, perhaps the solution adopted by most courts of allowing the
jury to decide the "net" cost of rearing the child by offsetting the recov-
ery by an amount which represents the benefits to the parents is as good
as any, provided, of course, that the jury is also instructed that the net
value can be zero.
If this system is adopted, what weight should be given to the fact
that the parents may have refused the option of abortion or placing the
child up for adoption after its birth? It could be argued that since the
parents had the opportunity to avoid the harmful consequences of the
defendant's negligence, they should be denied recovery for those ele-
ments of damages which their action could have prevented. The
counter to this argument is that the mitigation-of-damages doctrine re-
quires only that reasonable measures be taken.255 Both abortion and
giving up a child for adoption are so charged with religious, moral,
philosophical and emotional overtones that it is difficult to argue that
requiring a plaintiff to take either action as a condition of full recovery
for cost-of-rearing expenses is a reasonable measure. On the other
hand, to saddle a negligent physician or pharmacist with the full costs
of rearing a child to maturity when he or she does not receive any of
the joys or benefits of parenthood smacks of being punitive.
Except for a Delaware trial court, whose holding that the parents'
decision to keep rather than place for adoption a child born after an
unsuccessful sterilization amounted to a determination by the parents
that the benefits of parenthood outweighed the costs,256 no court has
254. In Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978), the court characterized
the financial consequences to the parents in that case as "catastrophic." Id. at 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d
at 953.
255. C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 33 (1935); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979).
256. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
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required parent-plaintiffs to make the Hobson's choice between abor-
tion or adoption and giving up a cause of action for the costs of
childrearing. The few cases which have considered this issue not only
have refused to rule on it as a matter of law but have also held that the
jury should be instructed that in weighing mitigation of damages they
should not take into account that the parents did not choose abortion or
placing the child up for adoption.257 Recognizing the possibility of ex-
cessive awards in such cases, however, the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota has mandated that the damages issue should be submitted to the
jury with a special verdict form along with explanatory instruction and
should be subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny."
258
Whether or not the best answer to the philosophical and ethical
questions posed by the task of determining the cost-of-rearing element
of damages in failed-contraception cases is to "leave it to the jury," it is
probably the most practical solution available if we are to rely on our
existing tort-litigation system for assessing compensation in such cases.
The courts are not indifferent to the difficulties, however, and as sug-
gested by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the responsibility is not that
of the courts alone:
The result we reach today is at best a mortal attempt to do jus-
tice in an imperfect world. In this endeavor we are not unmindful of
the deep and often times painful ethical problems that cases of this
nature will continue to pose for both courts and litigants. It is there-
fore our hope that future parents and attorneys would give serious
reflection to the silent interests of the child and, in particular, the
parent-child relationships that must be sustained long after legal con-
troversies have been laid to rest.
259
The court's reference to the responsibilities of parents and attor-
neys relates to the psychic and emotional harm that might be infficted
upon a child by the mere litigation of a failed-contraception case. Win
or lose, they have branded the child an "emotional bastard. 26 ° By the
act of bringing suit, parents may have caused more harm than can be
compensated by any damage award they may receive. But the risk of
inflicting psychic or emotional harm is not so great as to warrant a
public policy which would prohibit an action by parents for cost-of-
rearing expenses in all cases and in all circumstances-at least in the
view of the Minnesota court. In some cases, the harm may have oc-
curred already, as when the parents are not married to each other. Or
257. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
258. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
259. Id at 176-77.
260. Id at 173.
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the circumstances of the parents or the child may be such that the need
for financial support may outweigh the risk of emotional or psychic
harm to the child, as when the child has been born deformed or dis-
abled, necessitating extraordinary expenditures for its care. The
mother or father may be physically or emotionally incapable of
parenthood, also necessitating extraordinary child-care expenditures.
The Minnesota court, at least, would say that the initial balancing of
these interests should be done by the parents and their attorney, not by
the court.26' If the parents choose to litigate, then the court will not
strike down the cause of action but will make a "mortal attempt to do
justice in an imperfect world," '262 leaving it to the jury to assess net
damages suffered by the parents. Perhaps this is the fairest and most
practical solution to these difficult cases.
In two cases, prior-born brothers and sisters of the child born as a
result of failed contraception have sought recovery for a reduction in
the love and affection and financial support they would receive as a
result of the increase in size of the family.26 3 In both cases the court
gave short shrift to their claims and rightly so, but in at least two other
cases the courts have recognized that the necessity for the mother to
spread her love and affection over a larger family is a loss compensable
to her.26" Since the love and affection of a mother for her child would
seem to be capable of expansion to include additional family members
without diminishing that afforded prior members, it is not apparent
that such recovery should be allowed at all, nor, if allowed, what the
measure of this element of damages might be.
Only one decision has been discovered in which an infant has
sought recovery for its own wrongful life in a failed-contraception case.
In Elliott v. Brown,26 the plaintiff was born deformed after her father
had undergone a vasectomy-not for the purpose of preventing birth of
261. In a poignant footnote in the majority opinion in Sherlock, Justice Rogosheske, stating
his own personal view that the birth of a child should "always be regarded as a 'gift' of incalcula-
ble benefit to his parents," id. at 177 n.15, expressed the hope that parents would be dissuaded
from bringing actions principally for recovery of cost-of-rearing expenses. Id In a subsequent
footnote he pointed out the obligation imposed on attorneys by the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 7-10 "to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process
and to avoid the infliction of needless harm [on the infant]." Id at 177 n.16.
262. Id at 176.
263. Aronoffv. Snider, 292 So.2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (claim without foundation in
law or logic); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (relying on New
Jersey and New York precedents holding that a child had no right of action for the loss of services
of a parent resulting from the negligent injury of the parent).
264. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Bowman v. Davis, 48
Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
265. 361 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1978).
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a genetically defective child but rather to avoid endangering his wife's
health by a pregnancy. In holding that "there is no legal right not to be
born,"26 6 the court specifically rejected the rationale of the Appellate
Division in Park v. Chessin2 6 7 and in addition suggested that Park
might be distinguishable because in Park "there was a causal connec-
tion between the alleged negligence and the deformity." '268
The decision of the Alabama court in Elliott seems correct. More-
over, no circumstances can be visualized in which a cause of action by
an infant for its own wrongful life should be allowed in a failed-contra-
ception case. If the infant is born whole and healthy, no possible basis
of recovery can be visualized, since no harm has been inflicted. If the
child is born disabled, there also does not appear to be a basis for its
recovery. If the sterilization or contraceptive action was initiated for
any reason other than to avoid the risk of the particular disability suf-
fered, the birth of a disabled child was not within the range of reason-
able foreseeability and thus not within the outer perimeter of the duty
formula. If the sterilization or contraceptive action was initiated for the
purpose of avoiding the birth of a disabled child, then the situation is
closely analogous to Park and poses the same dilemma of measuring
no life against life in a diseased or disabled condition.
3. Abortion-Denied Cases. In the final category of wrongful
life cases, the defendant is almost invariably a physician, and the al-
leged wrongful acts on the physician's part can include several different
types of misfeasance or malfeasance. The wrongs most commonly al-
leged are failure to diagnose a condition of the fetus or the mother
which is likely to lead to the birth of a malformed or disabled child and
failure properly to advise the prospective parents of the risk of such a
condition once it is diagnosed, the result in either situation being the
birth of a disabled or deformed child. The alleged wrongful act may
also be a failure to diagnose the pregnancy sufficiently early to permit
the mother to obtain an abortion, or the botching of an abortion, the
result in either case being the birth of an unwanted-albeit normal and
healthy269-child.
266. Id at 548.
267. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) rev'dinpart on this ground sub noma. Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
268. 361 So.2d at 548.
269. The few reported cases of too-late-for-abortion diagnosis or botched abortion procedures
have resulted in the birth of healthy, normal babies. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). It is, of course, conceivable
that the child might not be healthy and normal, in which case a different set of issues is raised,
depending on whether the abnormality bears a causal relationship to the defendant's conduct.
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The earliest (and leading) case in the abortion-denied category is
Gleitman v. Cosgrove.270 In this case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
upheld a trial court's dismissal of a malpractice action by a child and
its parents against two physicians for negligence in advising the mother
that having had rubella when she was approximately one month preg-
nant would have no effect on her child. The child was subsequently
born deaf, nearly blind and mentally retarded. The infant's action was
for birth defects, the mother's for the effects on her emotional state
caused by the infant's condition and the father's for the costs of caring
for the infant. Although this was a pre-Roe case, availability of a legal
abortion to the plaintiff-mother was assumed by the majority.271 Nev-
ertheless, the firm New Jersey public policy against abortion permeated
the majority and concurring opinions.
Assuming the availability of a legal abortion to the mother, Justice
Proctor held for the majority that the child's action could not be main-
tained because the court could not measure the value of life in an im-
paired condition against the absence of life.272 The counts on behalf of
the mother and father presented different problems. The mother ar-
gued that an abortion would have freed her of the emotional problems
caused by the raising of a child with birth defects, and the father ar-
gued that it would have been less expensive for him to pay for his wife's
abortion than to raise the child.273 The court, relying on its "felt intui-
tion of human nature"274 that the unborn child, if he could have been
asked, would have chosen life with defects "as against no life at all"
2 75
and on its own evaluation of the value of the right to life and pointing
out that it was not faced with the necessity of balancing the mother's
life against the child's, found that eugenic considerations were not con-
trolling. In its dramatic phrasing:
We are not talking here about the breeding of prize cattle. It may
have been easier for the mother and less expensive for the father to
have terminated the life of their child while he was an embryo, but
these alleged detriments cannot stand against the preciousness of the
single human life to support a remedy in tort ...
Though we sympathize with the unfortunate situation in which
270. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
271. Id at 27, 227 A.2d at 691. However, Justice Francis, who joined the majority, based his
additional concurring opinion on a determination that abortion would have been illegal, thus
negating any duty that the defendants might have had to advise the parents of potential birth
defects. Id at 48, 227 A.2d at 703 (Francis, J., concurring).
272. Id at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. See text accompanying notes 216-43 supra, for a discussion of
this problem in a different context.
273. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692-93.
274. Id at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
275. Id
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these parents find themselves, we firmly believe the right of their
child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure
emotional and financial injury.2
Justice Jacobs, writing for himself and Justice Schettino in dissent,
stated his view that under the circumstances of the case Mrs. Gleitman
could have obtained a legal abortion-probably in New Jersey and cer-
tainly in another jurisdiction-and that the difficulty of dealing with
compensatory damages should not deter the court from allowing a
cause of action. Although he was somewhat vague about whether the
child himself should be able to recover for his impaired condition, Jus-
tice Jacobs expressed the firm view that any damages allowed "should
be dedicated primarily to his care and the lessening of his difficul-
ties."27 7
Chief Justice Weintraub, dissenting in part, agreed with the major-
ity's dismissal of the infant's claim. He would, however, have allowed
the parents' action, not for the care and cure of the child, for this was
"derivative and dependent upon the accrual of a right in the child,
278
but rather for the hurt suffered by the mother "in her own right by the
denial to her of her option to accept or reject a parental relationship
with the child"2 7 9 and by the father "as a victim of a wrong done to [the
mother]. 280
Although Gleitman has had substantial impact in other jurisdic-
tions where the same issues have been litigated,28' its authority, at least
as to the claims by the parents, has been considerably weakened by the
Supreme Court's 1973 abortion decisions. Reflecting as it did the pre-
vailing pre-Roe judicial view of the legality of abortion, the majority's
opinion gave precedence to the state's interest in protecting the unborn
child's "right to life" over the mother's choice not to endure the emo-
tional harm of the birth and rearing of a deformed child.282 The effect
276. Id at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
277. Id at 50, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
278. Id at 64, 227 A.2d at 711 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
279. Id at 64-65, 227 A.2d at 712.
280. Id at 65, 227 A.2d at 712.
281. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania law; Gleitman followed only to deny the child a cause of action); Smith v. United
States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (applying Texas law; Gleitman followed only to deny
the child a cause of action); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1977) (Gleitman followed to deny both parents and child a cause of action); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), a d, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283
N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (Gleitman followed to deny both parents and child a cause of
action); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (Gleitman followed to deny both parents
and child a cause of action) (dicta); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975) (Gleitman followed only to deny the child a cause of action).
282. 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
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of Roe is to reverse that order of precedence, at least until the fetus
becomes viable. 83 If, under Roe, a mother during the early periods of
pregnancy can, in consultation with her physician, elect to terminate
her pregnancy without articulating a reason, afortiori her right to do so
for eugenic reasons cannot be contested. Thus, the duty of the physi-
cian to diagnose and to advise the pregnant woman of the risks of birth
defects in the unborn child is apparent. With the taboo against abor-
tion lifted, the duty of the physician to counsel the pregnant mother as
to abortion is identical to that of the physician consulted prior to con-
ception as to the risks of passing along the genetic defects of prospec-
tive parents to an as yet unconceived child. If he fails to exercise
reasonable care in the performance of that duty, then he should be lia-
ble to the same extent as the physician in the failed-contraception situa-
tion already examined.
The few reported post-Roe cases seem to support that view. 284 In
Becker v. Schwartz,285 the companion case to Park on appeal, the New
York Court of Appeals joined the jurisdictions adopting this view. In
Becker the court found that a cause of action in medical malpractice
was stated on behalf of parents of a child born with Downs Syndrome
(mongolism) by allegations that a physician neither advised the expec-
tant parents of the increased risk of the disease when the mother was
over thirty-five nor of the availability of an amniocentesis test to deter-
mine whether the fetus was so afflicted.286
On the other hand, the falling of the barriers against abor-
tion-both prior to and subsequent to Roe- does not seem to have had
any impact on the wrongful life cause of action by the nonaborted in-
fant. Even those courts which have recognized a right of action in the
parents for the costs of rearing a nonaborted, disabled child and for
their own injuries flowing from the denial of the opportunity to abort
have not changed their position on denial of a cause of action on behalf
of the child.287
Because of the new constitutional stance on abortion, cases in
which the alleged malpractice is the failure to provide the mother an
283. 410 U.S. at 163.
284. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
285. 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
286. Id at 412-13. The New York Court of Appeals refused, however, to abandon its long-
standing rule against allowing recovery for psychic and emotional harm caused by the birth, suf-
fering and gradual death of their child. Id at 413-15.
287. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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opportunity to abort merely because she does not wish to have a child,
and the child is subsequently born healthy, seem legally indistinguish-
able from those involving failed contraception and subsequent healthy
birth.288
IV. CONCLUSION
The law concerning tort liability for injuries to the unborn has
evolved in several distinct but sometimes overlapping phases since the
first case was posed for the American judiciary by Dietrich in 1884. In
the first era there was uniformity of decision that recovery was not al-
lowed for prenatal injuries. That phase came to an abrupt end in 1946
with the Bonbrest decision. Just as Dietrich had received immediate
and universal acceptance, so also did Bonbrest; courts have been almost
unanimous in allowing a cause of action in at least some circumstances.
The phase immediately following Bonbrest was one in which injuries to
a viable fetus created a cause of action. This phase continues, in atten-
uated form, to the present; viability of the fetus remains a requirement
for recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus in most jurisdictions.
The next phase, which is not marked by any clear initial boundary
and continues to the present, is the era in which a cause of action is
recognized for injuries received by the fetus prior to viability. Renslow
represents the current furthest extension of that phase. Except for con-
tinuing disagreement among jurisdictions as to whether a cause of ac-
tion exists for the death of a fetus prior to its live birth, the law
developed during each of the foregoing phases appears to have reached
a state of relative stability. As to the live-birth requirement, the trend of
decisions, despite what the author considers compelling reasons to the
contrary,289 is to eliminate any such requirement. The recent decision
of the California Supreme Court denying an action in the absence of
live birth29° may lead to a reassessment or reversal of the majority
288. As in the failed-contraception cases, see text accompanying notes 249-61 supra, the diffi-
culty for the parents' cause of action lies in proving the injury when the child is born healthy. As
in the failed-contraception cases, courts have split over the question of whether the birth of a
healthy child is a "blessed event," the benefits of which, by operation of law, outweigh the injury
flowing from the event. Compare Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 App. Div. 2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966
(1975) and Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) ("blessed
event"-benefits by law outweigh injuries) with Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1976), Martineau v. Nelson, 247 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. 1976) andZiemba v. Sternberg, 45
App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (whether the benefits outweigh the injuries a question
of fact for the jury). As argued above, see text accompanying notes 256-62 supra, the most equita-
ble (and realistic) approach to injury is to treat it as a question of fact. See Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (a failed-contraception case).
289. See text accompanying notes 140-85 supra.




The newest phase in the developing law of the unborn was intro-
duced by actions seeking recovery for wrongful life or wrongful birth.
Although these actions have elements which in some ways set them
apart from the ordinary prenatal injury cases, they lend themselves to a
parallel analysis since the ultimate result of the acts upon which liabil-
ity is asserted is usually the birth of an infant in a less-than-whole con-
dition.
Although the jurisprudence of wrongful life has not yet reached a
stage of maturity which permits discernment of ultimate trends, most
courts appear to have agreed on two major premises. The first is that
parents may recover damages for the injuries they have suffered as a
result of a tortfeasor's negligence in causing or permitting the birth of
an unwanted child. Such a right of recovery is consistent with tradi-
tional tort theories of recovery and damages. The second is that the
child himself cannot recover for his own wrongful birth or life because
of the impossibility of measuring the value of life- even in a less-than-
whole state-against nonlife.
Park v. Chessin29 1 was a remarkable break from the unanimity
which seemed to mark the second premise. In Park, the Appellate Di-
vision appeared willing to accept the proposition that the difference be-
tween a whole life and life in less than whole condition is a
compensable harm if it is the result of the wrongful act of another, even
if the alternative available to the less-than-whole infant was not whole-
ness but nonexistence. Although the New York Court of Appeals has
now reversed Park,z92 restoring unanimity of judicial opinion, the Ap-
pellate Division's decision is sure to have some impact in other jurisdic-
tions. Even in overruling Park, the Court of Appeals referred to the
"emerging legal concept" of wrongful life2 93 and remarked on how,
having freed themselves from the conceptual difficulties formerly posed
by wrongful death actions, "courts have again been drawn toward the
murky waters at the periphery of existing legal theory to test the valid-
ity of a cause of action for what has been generically termed 'wrongful
life.' "294
The factual context of Park obviously was one which would in-
voke the sympathy of the court and cry out for relief for the individual
plaintiff. If cases in our system were decided ad hoc, such a decision
291. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) rev'd in part sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
292. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978).
293. 46 Id. at 408.
294. Id at 405.
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would probably be applauded. But our system of jurisprudence is one
in which individual decisions-particularly appellate decisions-have
a much broader impact. If Park stands for the proposition that whole-
ness of mind and body is the birthright of every child and that anyone
who has the legal power to determine whether the child shall be given
life owes a duty to use reasonable care to determine whether a prospec-
tive child will be born "whole" and owes a duty to use reasonable care
either to prevent conception or to abort a child whose prospects for a
healthy life are not good, the implications are enormous.295
In Park it was the physician-adviser who was found to have
breached his duty to the child in failing to provide the parents with
proper advice. With the continuing demise of intra-family immunity in
most American jurisdictions, 296 there seems to be no barrier to ex-
tending liability to the parents themselves, for it is the right of the child
himself to be born as a "whole, functional human being" 297 that Park
purports to protect. Once that threshold is crossed, finding an appro-
priate stopping point is an impossible task. Is a feeble-minded person,
or one suffering from hereditary diabetes, or one living in extreme pov-
erty and degradation, or an illegitimate less than a "whole, functional
human being?" Unless courts are willing to face these issues-and to
differentiate those conditions less than wholeness that create liability
from those that do not-they should not attempt to press legal tools
into a service they are entirely unsuited to perform. Rather, they
should follow the lead of the New York Court of Appeals in Williams v.
State:298 "Being born under one set of circumstances rather than an-
other or to one pair of parents rather than another is not a suable
wrong that is cognizable in court."
299
295. Not the least of these implications is that in most cases, the prediction of genetic defects is
based on statistical probabilities. If, for example, rubella in the early-stage pregnant mother
causes defects in one of five infants, a duty to abort in such circumstances would result in taking
the lives of four healthy infants for every one who would be saved from a handicapped life. See
note 95 supra.
296. See W. PROSSER, supra note 118, at 865; SUFFOLK L. Rev. Note, supra note 22, at 583.
297. Park, 60 App. Div. 2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
298. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
299. Id. at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
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